Karima Gadekrab Elsayed Mahmoud v Daniel Glanville & Anor (No2) (Pro Bono Costs Order)

Costs orders in proceedings concerning children remain exceptional because the usual objective is to preserve resources for the child and avoid damaging parental relationships. Nevertheless, unreasonable or reprehensible conduct of the litigation may justify a costs order. The conduct must concern the litigation rather than the child’s welfare, and unreasonable conduct merely permits the court to consider an order; it does not make an order automatic.

A pro bono costs order under Legal Services Act 2007, s 194, is available in children proceedings. The court must apply the ordinary children-proceedings costs principles while also giving effect to the statutory purpose of placing litigants on a more equal footing and supporting free legal assistance. The amount should ordinarily be summarily assessed by reference to the costs that would have been recoverable on a fee-paying basis.

The applicant father sought costs against the mother following extensive proceedings concerning their child. The proceedings had involved repeated breaches of orders, abductions, concealment of the child, unsupported allegations and further applications concerning the child’s welfare and parental responsibility.

The father sought both conventional costs and a pro bono costs order under s 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007, payable to the Access to Justice Foundation. The mother opposed the application, disputed responsibility for the litigation and asserted that she lacked financial means.

The central issues were whether the mother’s conduct justified costs despite the proceedings concerning a child, whether a pro bono costs order was legally available, and the appropriate amount and method of assessment.

1. Costs order. The court ordered the mother to pay the father £95,000, summarily assessed. Costs orders in children proceedings are generally rare because of the special considerations identified in Re T (Care Proceedings: Serious Allegations not Proved) [2012] UKSC 36 and Sutton London Borough Council v Davis (No 2) [1994] 1 WLR 1317. Those considerations do not prevent an order where the conduct of the litigation is unreasonable or reprehensible.
2. The mother’s conduct was wholly unreasonable and reprehensible. It included repeated unsupported allegations, attempts to frustrate and delay the proceedings, abduction and concealment of the child, and continued misuse of the costs application to raise spurious allegations. The conduct related to the litigation, not to the child’s welfare. The case was a paradigm case for a costs order.
3. Unreasonable or reprehensible conduct does not automatically require an order. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the usual reasons why costs orders are inappropriate in children proceedings. Other circumstances may also justify an order. The authorities include Re N (A child) v A and others [2010] 1 FLR 454, Re S (A Child) [2015] UKSC 20 and Re W (A Child) [2020] EWCA Civ 77.
4. Pro bono costs. A pro bono costs order under s 194 of the Legal Services Act 2007 was available notwithstanding that the proceedings concerned a child. The court had to consider both the children-proceedings costs principles and the statutory purpose of s 194, as explained in Manolete Partners v White [2024] EWCA Civ 1558. That purpose includes reducing the tactical inequality between privately funded and pro bono litigants and providing resources for free legal help.
5. The pro bono costs order was discretionary. It did not have to mirror exactly the order that would have been made absent pro bono representation. Once the conduct justified costs, the court could assess the equivalent fee-paying costs and order payment to the Access to Justice Foundation. The court ordered £20,000, also summarily assessed.
6. The court exercised its broad discretion according to reasonableness and proportionality. It could consider the paying party’s means, although it was not required to do so. Detailed assessment was inappropriate; the total liability of £115,000 was fair, just and reasonable.

This was a first-instance costs decision in ongoing Family Division proceedings. The judgment records that permission to appeal earlier orders and the orders made on 8 May 2025 had been refused by the Court of Appeal.