Sanman Property Management Limited v Samuel Ginda & Anor

Permission to bring private contempt proceedings for knowingly false statements requires a strong prima facie case that the statement was false and that the maker knew it was false. The court must also consider public interest, prosecutorial motive, proportionality, use of resources, the overriding objective, the likely penalty, the applicant’s suitability and the need for caution.

A contempt allegation framed as breach of a freezing order still requires permission where its substance is a knowingly false statement in an affidavit. Accurate disclosure of assets is central to the efficacy of the freezing-order regime. Permission was justified for deliberately false sworn asset information, but refused where the impugned wording had a plausible literal meaning and falsity could not be shown with sufficient strength.

Sanman sought permission under CPR 81.3(5)(b) to bring contempt proceedings against Samuel Ginda and TGDM One Ltd. The proposed proceedings concerned alleged false statements about a development payment received by TGDM and the balance of TGDM’s bank account, together with an alleged breach of a freezing order.

The court held that permission was required for grounds 1 and 3–5, while ground 2, based on a solicitor’s letter in existing High Court proceedings, did not itself require permission. The central issues were whether there was a strong prima facie case of falsity and knowledge, whether the freezing order had been breached, and whether contempt proceedings were in the public interest and proportionate.

1. Applicable principles. The court adopted the framework summarised in Olympic Council of Asia v Novans Jets LLP [2022] EWHC 2910 (Comm), together with the additional considerations identified in KJM Superbikes Limited v Hinton [2008] EWCA Civ 1280. The applicant had to show a strong prima facie case that the statement was false and knowingly so. The court also considered significance, use, motive, public interest, prosecutorial motive, resources, proportionality, the overriding objective, likely penalty, the applicant’s suitability and the need for great caution.
2. Permission requirement. A ground framed as breach of a freezing order still required permission where it was substantively based on a knowingly false statement in an affidavit. The wording of CPR 81.3(5)(b) was sufficiently broad to cover ground 4. Ground 2, based on a solicitor’s letter in existing proceedings, did not require permission. The approach in Cole v Carpenter [2020] EWHC 3155 (Ch) also supported the possibility of staying a non-permission ground where it substantially duplicated a refused ground, but that issue did not arise once permission was granted for grounds 3 and 4.
3. Grounds 1 and 5. Permission was refused. The references to the capitalised “Final Payment” could reasonably be understood as referring to the VAT-exclusive figure defined in the development management agreement. Sanman therefore failed to show a strong prima facie case that the statements were false. It also failed to show sufficiently strong evidence of deliberate falsity, significance, use or motive. The court further regarded additional proceedings on these grounds as potentially disproportionate.
4. Grounds 3 and 4. Permission was granted. The statement that TGDM’s only asset exceeding £10,000 was £9,315,733 was admittedly false; the account balance was materially higher. The circumstances established a strong prima facie case that Mr Ginda knew this and deliberately provided the wrong figure. The same conduct gave rise to a strong prima facie case of breach of paragraph 9 of the freezing order, whether the obligation was understood as requiring reasonable enquiries or merely disclosure to the best of the respondents’ ability.
5. The inaccurate sworn disclosure was sufficiently important to the freezing-order regime to justify the use of court resources and contempt proceedings. Sanman was a proper person to bring them, had no improper prosecutorial motive, and the proceedings were proportionate. Permission was accordingly granted for grounds 3 and 4.