BLV, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Asylum support is a last-resort safety net. Accommodation and financial support must meet a disabled person’s individual essential needs and provide an objectively dignified standard of living, but need not be ideal or promote human flourishing.

The statutory “no-choice” allocation policy does not prevent the Secretary of State from considering disability, health and other individual circumstances. Under the Equality Act 2010, however, the Secretary of State must also take reasonable steps to avoid disabled asylum seekers being placed at a substantial comparative disadvantage. That may require support securing substantive parity with able-bodied asylum seekers, even where the statutory minimum is met.

A decision inviting further evidence before determining additional support may remain lawful, provided it has not finally refused that support and the evidence available was inadequate.

The claimant, an asylum seeker who has been deaf since birth, is legally blind and has mental health conditions, challenged a decision refusing relocation from self-contained accommodation in Enfield and refusing WiFi or additional financial support for internet access.

The original decisions were withdrawn during the judicial review proceedings and replaced by a decision dated 4 July 2025. The court permitted the claim to be amended and determined the challenge pragmatically, while criticising the adoption of a rolling-review approach without a fresh claim or court permission.

The central issues were whether the accommodation and support were lawful under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, whether the defendant had complied with the Equality Act 2010, and whether Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention rights were engaged or breached.

1. Disposition. The claim for judicial review was dismissed.
2. Procedural approach. A judicial review directed at a specific decision should not ordinarily become a rolling challenge to later decisions. Fresh decisions should generally be challenged by fresh claims. Exceptions should be rare and require consideration of matters including lateness, urgency, public interest, fairness and whether permission and suitable directions are required. The defendant’s withdrawal of the challenged decisions should ordinarily have led to conclusion of the existing claim, with costs addressed separately. The court nevertheless determined the New Decision because both parties were ready to argue its merits.
3. Statutory adequacy. The “twin-track test” applied under ss.95–96 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. First, the court determines whether an objective minimum standard has been met: a dignified standard of living, adequate for health and capable of ensuring subsistence. Secondly, it reviews whether the Secretary of State’s evaluative judgment is rational and otherwise lawful. The test is measured against the individual’s circumstances, including disability, but the statutory scheme requires only essential needs and adequate accommodation, not optimal living conditions or the fullest possible participation in society.
4. The no-choice locality rule does not prevent consideration of disability, health, safety or other individual circumstances. The claimant’s self-contained accommodation in London represented appropriate concessions from the general allocation approach. Its distance from a preferred church and the resulting reduction in social opportunities did not make it legally inadequate.
5. Internet access and equality duties. The claimant’s need for stable video communication was an essential communication need. The Secretary of State’s standard payment calculation did not conclusively determine the individual support required. Under s.20(3) of the Equality Act 2010, the Secretary of State must seek substantive parity between disabled and comparable able-bodied asylum seekers. That duty may require additional cash or in-kind support even where the statutory minimum is met.
6. The New Decision was nevertheless lawful because it did not finally refuse additional support. It reasonably invited evidence about data usage, network options and the cost of an appropriate package. The evidence then available did not establish that WiFi was the only means of meeting the claimant’s needs or that his overall weekly allowance was insufficient.
7. The relocation refusal did not establish discrimination under ss.15, 19 or 20 of the Equality Act 2010, nor a breach of Articles 8 or 14. Article 8 was engaged by communication support, but the decision’s provisional and evidence-seeking character did not cross the applicable Convention threshold.

First instance judicial review. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.