Michael Quilligan, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice

The statutory power to recall a prisoner on licence is broad and is not confined to cases involving breach of a licence condition. Its purpose is public protection. Where recall is based on breach, there must nevertheless be reasonable grounds for concluding that a breach occurred and recall must be necessary in the circumstances.

Fairness may require proportionate enquiries before recall, particularly where unusual circumstances raise a real possibility that the prisoner was unaware of the licence or its conditions. The decision-maker must ensure that the material supplied is reasonably accurate and complete, including by considering culpability and alternatives to recall. Where a Parole Board has made materially conflicting findings, the Secretary of State must give adequate reasons for refusing to cancel the recall.

The claimant, a determinate prisoner, was due for release on licence but was transferred under an extradition warrant before leaving the United Kingdom for Ireland. After later returning to the United Kingdom, he came to the attention of the authorities following a drunk and disorderly allegation. The Secretary of State revoked his licence and recalled him to prison.

The Parole Board later found that no licence condition had been breached and that recall had not been appropriate, although it declined to direct release because of future risk. The Secretary of State refused to cancel the recall. The claimant sought judicial review of both decisions, relying on the statutory recall provisions, the fairness of the decision-making process and the adequacy of the reasons.

1. Release on licence. The claimant was deemed to have been released on licence when the custodial authority for his detention changed from his sentence to the extradition warrant. Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, release under section 244 was release on licence, even though detention continued in practice, no licence had been signed and the claimant had not been told of the licence or its conditions. The reasoning in R (Keiserie) v Secretary of State for Justice was applicable.
2. Scope of recall. Section 254 conferred a broad power to revoke a licence and recall a prisoner for public-protection reasons. It was not legally confined to breach of a licence condition. The second limb of the Calder approach, namely whether recall was necessary for public protection, remained applicable. The court adopted the approach in R (Gulliver) v Parole Board and R (Keiserie).
3. Initial recall. There was sufficient evidence to support a reasonable conclusion that the drunk and disorderly allegation engaged the good-behaviour condition. However, the alleged failure to keep in touch with a supervising officer could not be relied upon because the claimant had received no instructions. The material did not reasonably establish that he knowingly failed to submit to supervision, and the issue of culpability had not been considered.
4. The recall report and the Secretary of State’s reasons had to be read together. The report could be relied upon where its reasoning was adopted consistently, but inconsistent or unsupported reasons could not stand. In this unusual case, fairness required enquiries into whether the claimant could be contacted, informed of the licence requirements and supervised without recall. The failure to undertake proportionate enquiries made the recall unlawful.
5. Cancellation decision. In the particular circumstances, fairness required reasons for refusing to cancel the recall after the Parole Board’s material findings. The Secretary of State had to explain how those findings, including the finding that there had been no breach, had been considered. The refusal was quashed for inadequate reasons. The court did not decide the remaining grounds concerning irrationality and the possible continuation of detention based on future risk.
6. Relief. A quashing order was appropriate for both the unlawful recall and the refusal to cancel it. Delay and the Parole Board’s risk assessment did not justify limiting relief to a declaration. The claim for damages for false imprisonment was left for fuller argument.

First-instance judicial review proceedings. Permission was granted by Aiden Eardley KC, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, on 14 July 2025, with an extension of time to challenge the March 2023 recall decision.