Hynot Limited, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero & Anor

In an environmental impact assessment, the scope and level of detail required are matters of evaluative judgment for the decision-maker. The court will intervene only on conventional public law grounds, and the legislation requires an adequate basis for consultation, not perfection. The assessment must remain focused on the specific project for which consent is sought. Separate projects are not indirect, secondary or cumulative effects merely because they form part of a wider cluster. Hypothetical effects and speculation cannot supply the necessary evidential basis. Under regulation 12(3), the decision-maker need publish only information directly relevant to deciding whether significant environmental effects are likely, rather than every document received. Judicial review claims concerning major infrastructure must be brought promptly; the three-month period is a backstop, not a target.

Hynot Limited sought permission to apply for judicial review of the Secretary of State’s agreement to consent for the HyNet offshore carbon dioxide transportation and storage project under the Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Unloading and Storage (Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2020. It also challenged a subsequent consent decision by the North Sea Transition Authority, although no properly formulated claim was advanced against that decision.

The claimant alleged failures concerning major accidents and disasters, consultation, cumulative climate effects and the Offshore Petroleum Activities (Conservation of Habitats) Regulations 2001. The defendants also argued that the claim was not brought promptly under CPR 54.5(1)(a). The court considered whether any ground was arguable and, alternatively, whether delay barred the claim.

1. Permission refused. None of the claimant’s grounds had a realistic prospect of success. The court also held, alternatively, that the claim was not brought promptly.
2. Decisions about what information an environmental statement should contain, the level of detail required and the extent of analysis are matters of judgment for the Secretary of State. Provided the statutory requirements are understood, intervention is limited to classic Wednesbury principles. EIA legislation requires an adequate basis for public consultation and reasoned decision-making; it does not impose perfection. Finch did not alter that approach, because it concerned a question of legal principle rather than the adequacy of an assessment as a matter of judgment.
3. The environmental statement and further information addressed reasonably foreseeable major accidents and disasters, their effects and mitigation. The alleged cumulative risks from other HyNet-related projects were unsupported by evidence and depended on speculation or conjecture.
4. Regulation 12(3) required publication of information which the Secretary of State considered directly relevant to deciding whether significant environmental effects were likely. It did not require publication of every document, or every document in full, from which relevant information was drawn. The complaint was also raised too late: the regulation 12(3) notice was a final decision, and the claimant had not objected during the consultation.
5. The cumulative-effects assessment properly focused on the offshore carbon transportation and storage development and related pipeline projects with a functional relationship to it. The hydrogen production plants were separate projects subject to their own consent and EIA processes. Their emissions were not effects of the development, and quantifying emissions from unknown industrial sources would have been speculative.
6. The Secretary of State carried out an appropriate assessment under the Habitats Regulations and properly engaged with the statutory nature conservation bodies. The differing advice concerning works during the overwintering period was considered, and the conclusion that the proposed condition protected site integrity was rational. There was no general statutory duty to consult the public on the appropriate assessment.
7. Time ran from the legally operative decision, namely the Secretary of State’s decision of 17 March 2025, rather than its later publication. In any event, filing on the last day of the three-month period was not prompt. The scale and documentation of the project did not justify delay, particularly where major infrastructure and substantial third-party interests were involved.
8. The court declined to decide whether a heightened permission threshold should apply in urgent, nationally significant planning cases, because the claim failed even the ordinary arguability test. It also did not need to consider section 31(3C) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.