SIA Investment Industry v Pardus Wealth Limited & Anor

In sentencing for contempt arising from breaches of a freezing order, the court must assess seriousness by reference to culpability and harm, consider whether a fine suffices, and impose the shortest custodial term that properly reflects the contempt where imprisonment is necessary.

Disclosure breaches supporting a freezing order are inherently serious because they impede the policing, tracing and preservation of assets. A continuing breach may justify a sentence containing both punitive and coercive elements, with the latter potentially remitted following prompt and full compliance. Mental disorder, remorse and admissions require careful consideration, but do not materially reduce culpability where the contemnor understood the order and remained in deliberate breach.

The applicant pursued contempt proceedings against Gregory Robert Bryce for breaches of a freezing order made on 17 November 2023. In the earlier committal proceedings, the court found three serious breaches: inadequate disclosure of assets, failure to provide an affidavit verifying disclosure, and diminishing available equity in Saffron House by extending a loan.

Sanction and costs were adjourned to allow mitigation, including psychiatric evidence. At the sanction hearing, Mr Bryce remained in breach of the disclosure and verification obligations. The issues were the seriousness of the contempt, the appropriate sanction, whether any custodial sentence should be suspended, and the costs consequences.

1. Seriousness. The court was sure that Mr Bryce remained in continuing contempt. The disclosure breaches caused substantial prejudice because they prevented the applicant and the court from policing the freezing order and tracing assets. The breaches were deliberate, conscious and contumacious. The omission of a €500,000 Tenerife property illustrated their seriousness.
2. Sentencing approach. The court applied the approach identified in Attorney General v Crosland: assess culpability and harm, consider whether a fine is sufficient, impose the shortest custodial term properly reflecting the seriousness where custody is necessary, and give due weight to mitigation and the impact on others. The factors in Crystal Mews, expanded in Asia Islamic, were relevant to the assessment.
3. Mental disorder and mitigation. Mr Bryce’s depressive disorder explained some difficulty engaging with the order but had, at most, a limited effect on judgment, rational choice and understanding of consequences. It did not significantly reduce culpability. His late admissions, apology, remorse, previous lack of relevant convictions and mental disorder were taken into account, but their weight was reduced by his failure to purge the contempt.
4. Sanction. A fine was insufficient. Immediate custody was required. The court imposed 15 months’ imprisonment, comprising a punitive element of six months and a coercive element which could be considered for remission if Mr Bryce promptly and fully complied with paragraphs 8 and 10 of the Freezing Order. Suspension was inappropriate because continuing non-compliance provided no realistic prospect of rehabilitation.
5. Costs. The applicant was awarded the costs of the contempt application and sanction hearing on the indemnity basis. The court summarily assessed them at £78,234.76 and £20,080 respectively.

First-instance sanction judgment following an earlier committal hearing in the same proceedings. The earlier Contempt Judgment was reported at [2024] EWHC 2588 (Comm). The court issued a warrant of committal and recorded a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal within 28 days.