MP (A Child; Habitual Residence), Re

Habitual residence is determined by a global, comparative analysis of the child’s circumstances. Physical presence and parental intention are relevant, but neither is determinative. The court must assess the child’s actual experience, including the duration, regularity, conditions and reasons for presence, education, family and social relationships, and the degree of integration into each relevant environment.

For a young child, particular weight may be given to the integration of the person on whom the child is principally dependent. Recent lived experience may carry greater weight than earlier arrangements or future intentions. Tax-residence restrictions do not decide habitual residence, but may evidence a degree of impermanence in the child’s presence. On the facts, the child was habitually resident in Country B, so the courts of Country B had primary jurisdiction under the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.

The father and mother lived an international lifestyle, dividing their time between England, Country B and Country C. Their four-year-old child had homes, family connections, education and activities in more than one jurisdiction and had never spent more than about three continuous months in any country.

Following the parents’ separation, the child remained in Country B with the mother, contrary to an agreement that he would return to England for the autumn term. The father issued proceedings in England seeking child arrangements and protective orders. The mother argued that the child was habitually resident in Country B and that the English courts lacked jurisdiction.

The central issue was the child’s habitual residence at the dates on which the English proceedings were issued.

1. The court found that the child was habitually resident in Country B when the father’s Children Act proceedings were issued on 29 July 2025, when his High Court applications were issued on 4 September 2025, and at the date of judgment. The courts of Country B therefore had primary jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility under Article 5 of the 1996 Hague Child Protection Convention.

2. Habitual residence required a global analysis of all relevant factors. The assessment was not mathematical or formulaic. The court compared the child’s connections with England and Country B, including homes, education, health care, family and friends, activities, language, parental relationships, duration and regularity of stays, and the reasons for those stays.

3. The child’s substantial time in each jurisdiction was relevant but not determinative. Qualitative experience mattered more than total days. The child’s presence in England had always been subject to the family’s need to remain within tax-residence limits. That did not prevent habitual residence in England as a matter of law, but it created an element of impermanence which weighed against it.

4. For a young child, the integration of the persons on whom the child depends was relevant. The mother had been the child’s near-constant carer and was habitually resident in Country B by late spring 2025, given her nationality, family and social connections, business interests, taxation and recent pattern of residence. This materially supported the conclusion that the child was habitually resident there.

5. The child’s recent lived experience carried greater weight than earlier periods of nursery attendance in England or the parents’ intention that he should attend an English preparatory school in 2026. The child had spent very little time in England since December 2024 and had become integrated into his nursery and social environment in Country B.

6. The application for cross-examination was refused because it was unnecessary on the limited jurisdictional issue and would have caused unacceptable delay. The court’s determination was confined to habitual residence and jurisdiction.