Malathi Latha Sriram (Mukti Roy) v Louise Mary Brittain

A bankrupt is not entitled to broad disclosure from a trustee merely because information may relate to disputed assets, trustee remuneration, tax, data use or possible claims. Disclosure must have a legitimate purpose, be relevant and proportionate to its likely usefulness. Challenges to remuneration and expenses should ordinarily be made at the appropriate stage of the bankruptcy administration. An injunction will not be granted where the applicant identifies no sufficient interest or legal basis, particularly where the relevant assets are already subject to court proceedings. A claim may be struck out or summarily dismissed where its pleaded basis is incoherent, the claimant cannot identify the capacity in which the claim is brought, or the alleged loss is not attributable to the defendant.

The judgment determined two applications arising from the bankruptcy of Malathi Latha Sriram. She sought disclosure from Louise Mary Brittain, her trustee in bankruptcy, and an injunction restraining further disposal of bankruptcy assets. Pantera Property Limited applied to strike out, or obtain reverse summary judgment on, Malathi’s claim alleging negligence, trespass, breach of statutory duty, unjust enrichment and data breaches concerning the sale and repossession of 11 Westfields Avenue.

The court considered the relevance and proportionality of the requested disclosure, the timing of any challenge to trustee remuneration and expenses, Malathi’s alleged interests in properties, and whether her claim against Pantera was legally and factually sustainable.

1. Disclosure and injunction. The application for disclosure was dismissed. The requests were unsupported, disproportionate, oppressive or irrelevant. Some documents did not exist, some matters belonged in separate possession and sale proceedings, and information already supplied by the trustee was adequate. Any challenge to remuneration or expenses should ordinarily be made after completion of the bankruptcy administration under rr 10.87 and 18.35 of the Insolvency (England and Wales) Rules 2016.
2. Disclosure concerning alleged data misuse was refused. The alleged misuse was unsubstantiated and such issues were primarily matters for the Information Commissioner. Requests concerning safeguarding, equality and prior communications were likewise unsupported or disproportionate.
3. The injunction application was also dismissed. The trustee was an officer of the court and could not properly pre-empt the court’s determination of pending possession and sale applications. In any event, Malathi had not established an interest sufficient to support injunctive relief. The trustee’s undertaking not to dispose of two properties was incorporated into the order, with liberty to apply.
4. Pantera’s application. The application to adjourn was refused. The claim was struck out and/or summary judgment was entered for Pantera. The decision to sell and the sale price were matters for the trustee, not Pantera. Pantera had not taken possession of the property, and any claim concerning loss did not appear to lie against it.
5. The pleading was also unsustainable because Malathi asserted both personal freehold ownership and possible beneficial ownership by family members, without identifying the capacity in which she sued. The reference to Mukti Roy as a different legal entity did not assist, since it was simply another name for Malathi.
6. The judge made no finding that false authorities had been deliberately supplied. The observations concerning fake or irrelevant authorities, including R (Ayinde) v London Borough of Haringey, were explanatory and not necessary to the disposal of the applications.

This was a first-instance decision. The judgment referred to an earlier unsuccessful annulment application determined by ICC Judge Mullen on 19 April 2024, but gave no citation for that decision.