Case details
Summary
A public authority does not generally owe a duty to protect a person from self-harm. An assumption of responsibility may arise where the authority has control over a vulnerable person, but that responsibility ordinarily ends when custody and control end. Release may form part of the custodial duty where release must be into a safe environment, but it does not itself create continuing post-release responsibility.
A constable may use section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 only where the statutory conditions are met, including an apparent mental disorder and immediate need for care or control. There is no free-standing common-law power to detain pending mental-health assessment which would expand those statutory limits. On the facts, release with insulin and syringes was lawful and reasonable.
Factual background
The claimant, an insulin-dependent diabetic with a history of alcohol and drug misuse, self-harm and unstable accommodation, was arrested after police were told that he intended to overdose on insulin. He was detained in custody, seen by healthcare professionals, offered a mental-health assessment and released with insulin and syringes after the criminal investigation resulted in no further action.
He later took a near-fatal insulin overdose and suffered severe brain injury. He alleged that the police had assumed responsibility for his safety, should have arranged a full mental-health assessment, should have detained him under section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 or common-law necessity, and should not have released him with insulin. The central issues were duty, breach, lawful detention, the adequacy of the pre-release risk assessment, and causation.
Held
- Claim dismissed. The defendant assumed responsibility to take reasonable care for the claimant’s safety while he was in custody. That responsibility included releasing him into a safe environment, because release formed part of the detention process. It did not continue after release where the defendant no longer exercised actual or constructive control over him.
- The relevant context was decisive. The claimant had capacity, had engaged with his solicitor and interviewing officers, had eaten and administered insulin in custody, and displayed no obvious active symptoms of mental illness on the healthcare professional’s assessment. The assessment was limited because he refused to engage, but it was sufficient to conclude that there was no obvious active mental illness. The custody officer was entitled to rely on that professional assessment.
- Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983 required it to appear to the constable that the person was suffering from mental disorder and was in immediate need of care or control. Those conditions were not met at release. Detention under section 136 would therefore have been unlawful. The mere existence of section 13 powers or duties did not establish a duty of care or provide an alternative route to detention.
- There was no separate common-law power to detain pending mental-health assessment. Such a power would be arbitrary and would defeat the legislative purpose of the statutory scheme. The reasoning in R (Sessay) v South London and Maudsley NHS Trust was adopted on that point.
- The pre-release risk assessment was broadly adequate. It recorded vulnerability, health issues and suicide or self-harm threats, identified mitigation, and followed the relevant College of Policing guidance. Even if it had been inadequate, a lawful mental-health detention would not have followed. The claimant was released to the safest available place after refusing alternatives, and there was no sufficient reason to confiscate insulin that he needed to survive.
- There was no breach in any event. The statutory limits on detention and the fundamental right to liberty required careful restraint. Article 2 was not engaged because the facts known at release did not establish a real and immediate risk of suicide. Causation was also unlikely: on the accepted expert evidence, further examination would probably not have resulted in detention.
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