White Rock Corporation Ltd v Middle Volga Shipping Company & Anor

A lower court may determine an application for permission to appeal only at the decision hearing or an adjournment formally made by that time. A general direction that consequential matters will be dealt with on paper does not necessarily adjourn the decision hearing, particularly where the party has not indicated an intention to seek permission. An adjournment also does not extend the time for filing an Appellant’s Notice. Where jurisdiction is absent, the applications must be made to the appeal court. The judge further observed that, had jurisdiction existed, permission would have been refused where the proposed appeal challenged factual evaluation rather than an identifiable error of law.

The claimant challenged an earlier judgment which had allowed the first defendant’s application under CPR rule 11(1) contesting the court’s jurisdiction. Consequential issues were dealt with on written submissions. The claimant subsequently sought permission to appeal and directions concerning the time for filing an Appellant’s Notice. The first defendant opposed both applications as out of time and lacking a real prospect of success.

The central issues were whether the decision hearing had been formally adjourned, whether the court retained jurisdiction to determine permission and time-extension applications, and, alternatively, whether the proposed grounds satisfied the applicable appeal threshold.

1. Costs. The first defendant was the successful party. Its costs were reasonable and proportionate and were summarily assessed at £78,850.25.
2. Permission to appeal. Under CPR rule 52.3(2), an application to the lower court must be made at the hearing at which the decision was made or at an adjournment of that hearing. The decision hearing generally includes the remote or formal hand-down of a reserved judgment.
3. A formal adjournment for a later permission application presupposes that the party has indicated an intention to seek permission or is considering doing so, has sought an adjournment, and that the court has formally adjourned the hearing. The direction that consequential issues would be dealt with on paper did not amount to such an adjournment. The judge’s uncommunicated intention was not determinative, but in this case no adjournment had been ordered by the hand-down date. The court therefore lacked jurisdiction to determine the application.
4. The judge preferred the approach in Elbanna v Clark [2024] EWHC 1471 (KB) to the contrary approach in Terna Energy Trading doo v Revolut Ltd [2024] EWHC 1524 (Comm). Had jurisdiction existed, permission would have been refused. The proposed grounds principally challenged factual and evidential evaluation, including the application of the good arguable case principles in Kaefer Aislamientos SA de CV v AMS Drilling Mexico SA de CV [2019] EWCA Civ 10, rather than identifying an error of law or construction.
5. Appellant’s Notice. An adjournment of the decision hearing does not itself extend the period for filing an Appellant’s Notice. The ordinary period under CPR rule 52.12(2)(b) ran from the hand-down date. As no adjournment had occurred, the court also lacked jurisdiction to extend time. If jurisdiction had existed, the judge would have granted a 21-day extension because the breach was significant rather than serious, arose from an understandable procedural misapprehension, and caused no prejudice.
6. The claimant would have to make the appropriate applications to the Court of Appeal.

The judgment itself records the earlier jurisdiction decision, handed down on 7 August 2025, but gives no citation for it. The present court declined jurisdiction over the claimant’s applications for permission to appeal and for an extension of time. It stated that permission would alternatively have been refused, while an extension would alternatively have been granted.