Director of Public Prosecutions v Denis Micura

Under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988, “the person keeping the vehicle” means the person with actual day-to-day care and control of it at the time of the alleged offence, rather than merely the registered keeper or a subsequent keeper. The statutory defence in section 172(4) is available only in a case under section 172(2)(a). A person falling within section 172(2)(b) must provide any information in their power which may lead to identification of the driver. That may include identifying a previous keeper, even if the person does not know who was driving. Failure to complete a notice accurately can therefore constitute the offence under section 172(3).

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the acquittal of Denis Micura by Cheltenham Magistrates’ Court on a charge of failing to provide information relating to the identification of a driver, contrary to section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The magistrates accepted that Mr Micura was not the keeper at the time of the motoring offence, did not know who was driving, and had exercised due diligence. They nevertheless acquitted him, relying on the defence in section 172(4).

The central issue was whether a subsequent keeper, who received a section 172 notice, was required to identify the previous keeper and could rely on the statutory defence where he could not identify the driver.

1. Appeal allowed. The magistrates had erred in law. The acquittal on charge 2 was set aside, and the case was remitted with a direction that the magistrates convict the respondent.
2. “The person keeping the vehicle” in section 172(2)(a) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 means the person with actual day-to-day care and control of the vehicle at the date of the alleged offence. It does not mean merely the registered keeper, and it does not include a person who became keeper after the offence.
3. The distinction between the actual keeper and the registered keeper is deliberate. Section 172(10) defines the registered keeper by reference to registration under the Vehicle Excise and Registration Act 1994, but the obligation in section 172(2)(a) concerns the person expected to know the identity of the driver because of actual care and control.
4. The defence in section 172(4) applies only to an obligation arising under section 172(2)(a). It was therefore unavailable to the respondent, whose obligation arose under section 172(2)(b).
5. A person within section 172(2)(b) must provide information in their power which may lead to identification of the driver. The respondent was required by the notice to identify the previous keeper in section C. His inability to identify the driver, and the possibility that the police could investigate through other routes, did not discharge that obligation.
6. The notice was sufficiently clear. It expressly required a present keeper who had not been keeper at the time of the offence to provide details of the previous keeper. The respondent knew that information but failed to provide it, thereby committing the offence under section 172(3).

• Cheltenham Magistrates’ Court: acquitted the respondent of both charges following trial on 18 September 2024.
• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by way of case stated, set aside the acquittal on charge 2, and remitted the case with a direction to convict.