Mujanet Daniah & Anor v The Secretary of State for Education

Appeals against teacher prohibition orders ordinarily proceed by way of review. The court asks whether the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. It gives substantial deference to the Secretary of State and professional conduct panels on factual and evaluative matters, including risk, public interest and proportionality.

A criminal conviction admitted or properly established is not ordinarily reopened in regulatory proceedings. Later events generally cannot show that the original prohibition decision was wrong, although they may be relevant to a later review application. Prohibition orders are protective and regulatory rather than punitive. The public interest in pupil protection and confidence in the teaching profession may justify prohibition where less intrusive measures are inadequate.

The appellants operated the Advance Education Centre, which was found by Westminster Magistrates’ Court to have been an unregistered independent school providing full-time education. Their convictions under section 96(2) of the Education and Skills Act 2008 were upheld by the Crown Court.

Professional conduct panels found that the convictions involved breaches of the Teachers’ Standards. The Secretary of State then imposed prohibition orders, allowing review after five years in the case of the first appellant and two years in the case of the second.

The appellants appealed under CPR Part 52, arguing lack of insight and remorse, no risk of repetition, disproportionality, fresh evidence and procedural irregularity. The central issues were the proper appellate approach, the effect of the convictions, and whether the prohibition orders were wrong or procedurally unjust.

1. Disposition. Both appeals were dismissed. The appeals proceeded by way of review, not rehearing. Under CPR r.52.21(3), intervention required a decision which was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity.
2. Deference and scope of review. Findings of fact by a professional conduct panel should not be disturbed unless perverse. The panel and the Secretary of State are expert decision-makers entitled to substantial deference on professional conduct, risk of repetition, public interest and the necessity and terms of a prohibition order.
3. Convictions. The appellants accepted their convictions and could not use the regulatory appeals to re-argue the factual basis of convictions reached to the criminal standard. The PCPs were entitled to proceed on the basis that the convictions were properly entered, subject only to exceptional circumstances, none of which was shown.
4. Later events. Subsequent training, community work, employment evidence and claimed remorse could not ordinarily establish that the original decisions were wrong, because the decisions had to be reviewed by reference to the material available when made. Such matters could be relied upon in applications to review the orders after the specified periods.
5. Proportionality. The Secretary of State was required to weigh pupil protection and public confidence in the teaching profession against the impact on the teacher, including whether a less intrusive measure would suffice. The detailed assessments in both cases were open to the Secretary of State and disclosed no error of principle.
6. Fresh evidence and procedural irregularity. The proposed fresh evidence did not satisfy the principles in Ladd v Marshall and did not assist the appellants. The alleged omission of Crown Court evidence from the PCP bundles did not undermine the decisions, particularly since the appellants admitted the relevant convictions and did not adduce the evidence or seek an oral hearing before the PCPs.

The judgment does not state a prior appellate decision concerning the prohibition orders. It records that the appellants’ criminal convictions and sentences were upheld by the Crown Court before the regulatory appeals to the High Court.