James Turner v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor

For service of an enforcement notice, “premises” ordinarily means the land to which the notice relates. Where one enforcement notice concerns a single planning unit containing multiple occupational compounds, affixing the notice conspicuously to an object at the site’s only access may satisfy the statutory service requirement. Whether an unserved occupier suffered substantial prejudice is fact-specific. Evidence that the occupier would have appealed may support prejudice, but it is not conclusive. An inspector may reasonably find no substantial prejudice where the alleged appeal is unexplained and the occupier had an opportunity to participate in the existing appeal but chose not to do so.

The appellant challenged an Inspector’s decision upholding, subject to minor variations, an enforcement notice issued by Buckinghamshire Council concerning Gladwins Wood. The appeal was brought under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and concerned only ground (e), namely alleged failure to serve copies of the notice as required by section 172.

The Inspector found that service on occupiers was effective when copies were sent to some occupiers and the notice was affixed to the entrance gates. Alternatively, he found that any failure of service had not substantially prejudiced the occupiers under section 176(5). The issues were whether the gates were objects on the relevant “premises” for section 329(2), whether the Inspector’s approach to substantial prejudice was lawful, and whether the appellant was entitled to costs.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. Section 329(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 must be read consistently with section 172(2)(a), which requires service on the occupier of the land to which the enforcement notice relates. In this context, “the premises” ordinarily means that land. The Inspector therefore made no error in treating the appeal site, rather than each individual compound, as the relevant premises.

2. Method of service. Section 329(2)(b)(ii) permits service where the notice is addressed to the occupier and is affixed conspicuously to an object on the premises. The notice was fixed to the gates across the only access to the Land. There was no suggestion that it was not conspicuously affixed. The statutory purpose was therefore met. The alternative construction would have made enforcement impracticable on a large site with changing and uncertain occupation.

3. Ground 2 dismissed as academic and, alternatively, on its merits. Whether non-service caused substantial prejudice under section 176(5) is fact-specific. An occupier who learned of the notice too late to appeal and provides evidence that it would have appealed may often establish substantial prejudice, but that is not the only permissible conclusion. Here, the only complaining occupier gave no indication of the grounds it would have pursued, did not attend the inquiry or make representations despite knowing about it, and relied on a speculative assertion. The Inspector was entitled to conclude that no occupier had suffered substantial prejudice.

4. The Costs Ground was dismissed because the appellant failed on Grounds 1 and 2. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.

• High Court (Planning Court): Appeal under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against the Inspector’s decision dated 31 May 2024. The appeal was dismissed on all grounds.