Robin Houldsworth, R (on the application of) v The Commissioners for HMRC

An extension of time for judicial review may be granted where there is a good reason to extend time, which is broader than a good reason for the delay. Relevant considerations include the explanation for delay, the importance and arguability of the issues, prejudice and the effect on good administration. A claimant may properly pursue an alternative tribunal remedy before bringing judicial review where there is an arguable jurisdictional issue, particularly where earlier proceedings would probably have been stayed. An extension application need not be contained in the specified section of the claim form if it is made in an accompanying document. At the permission stage, alternative public-law grounds may proceed where they raise substantially the same arguable complaint.

The claimant challenged HMRC’s closure notice assessing him to tax on the basis that he was UK resident in 2004/2005. He had first pursued an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, including a legitimate-expectation argument based on paragraph 2.2 of IR20. The Tribunal struck out that ground for want of jurisdiction on 13 March 2024. The claimant then commenced judicial review proceedings and sought an extension of the CPR 54.5(1) time limit.

Permission had been refused on paper, principally for delay and lack of an unambiguous representation. The issues on renewal were whether the extension application was properly made and, if so, whether the claim was arguable.

1. Extension application. An application to extend time was properly formulated even though section 9 of the claim form was incomplete. The application appeared in the accompanying Statement of Grounds, and neither the CPR nor the applicable practice direction required it to be made only in section 9.
2. Principles governing extension. The relevant question is whether there is a good reason to extend time, rather than merely whether there was a good reason for the delay. The court must consider all the circumstances, including the period and explanation for delay, the importance of the issues, prospects of success, prejudice and detriment to good administration. The claimant’s pursuit of the FTT proceedings was a satisfactory explanation. There was an arguable basis for believing that the FTT had jurisdiction, and an earlier judicial review would probably have been stayed. The wider significance of the IR20 issue, its financial importance, compliance with the pre-action protocol and the absence of prejudice also supported an extension.
3. Merits. The claimant only had to show that the claim was arguable. It was sufficiently arguable that paragraph 2.2 of IR20 represented that a taxpayer satisfying its specified conditions would be treated as non-resident without a wider factual inquiry. It was also arguable whether paragraph 2.2 required an independently established distinct break with the UK, or treated compliance with its conditions as sufficient.
4. Alternative grounds and order. The Wednesbury unreasonableness and abuse-of-power grounds were alternative formulations of the same arguable complaint. The extension was granted and permission was granted on all three grounds.

• First-tier Tribunal: Ground 3 was struck out for want of jurisdiction on 13 March 2024.
• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission was refused on paper on 31 July 2025. On oral renewal, the court granted an extension of time and permission on all three grounds.