R v Jetmir Topuzi

On an appeal concerning criminal legal aid remuneration, the determining officer must assess the figure that provides reasonable remuneration. The task is broader than multiplying reasonable hours by an hourly rate. The amount of work claimed must be assessed against the document produced and all the circumstances, including the complexity of the issues and the advocate’s familiarity with the case. The final document may not bear a direct relationship to the time spent preparing it. Nevertheless, an allowance must make sufficient provision for work actually carried out. Where the claimed time and fee are unsupported by the finished document, the appeal may succeed to a limited extent and the court may substitute an assessment reflecting the time and effort reasonably remunerated.

Counsel appealed under Regulation 29 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, as amended, against the determining officer’s assessment of £400 plus VAT for preparing advice and grounds of appeal in a criminal case. Counsel had acted at trial and claimed £1,250 plus VAT for 13½ hours’ work. The determining officer considered the claim excessive in light of counsel’s familiarity with the case and the contents of the ten-page document. The central issue was the amount that constituted reasonable remuneration for the work undertaken.

1. The appeal was allowed to a limited extent. The determining officer’s task was not simply to identify reasonable time and multiply it by an hourly rate. The statutory task was to assess a figure providing reasonable remuneration, which was a broader concept.
2. The determining officer had accurately described the contents of the advice and grounds of appeal. That document did not, on its face, support the full amount of time claimed. The court accepted that counsel had spent the claimed time, but the time spent did not necessarily establish that the resulting fee was reasonable.
3. Time spent exploring possible arguments may exceed the work ultimately reflected in the completed document. A final document may therefore bear no direct relationship to the time spent producing it. That consideration could explain counsel’s expenditure of time, but did not justify the full claim.
4. An assessment must nevertheless make sufficient allowance for work actually carried out. The sum of £400 was inadequate. The court substituted £650, broadly reflecting a day’s work in terms of the time and effort to be remunerated.
5. Counsel was entitled to claim the £100 appeal fee, but nothing further in respect of the costs of the appeal. The appropriate additional payment was accordingly £250, together with the £100 already paid on appeal.

• Determining officer: counsel’s claim was initially assessed at £350 plus VAT and, on reconsideration, increased to £400 plus VAT.
• High Court (Senior Court Costs Office): the appeal under Regulation 29 was allowed to a limited extent and the assessment was substituted with £650 plus VAT, together with the £100 appeal payment; no further appeal costs were allowed.