Coventry City Council, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A public authority’s statements about a target for distributing asylum accommodation do not necessarily create a promise that a fixed numerical limit will never be exceeded. The meaning of such statements depends on their context, including the authority’s statutory duty, unpredictable demand, available accommodation and the practical time needed to achieve wider distribution.

A substantive legitimate expectation requires a clear, unambiguous and unqualified representation. A public authority may depart from such an expectation where objectively justified as a proportionate response, or where required by law. Published policies require conscientious consideration and clear reasons for departure, but the ultimate review remains principally one of rationality.

The statutory purpose of the relevant accommodation provisions was preventing destitution, not achieving geographical dispersal. The claim was dismissed.

Coventry City Council challenged the Secretary of State’s accommodation of asylum seekers in Coventry under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The Council argued that the Secretary of State had breached substantive and procedural legitimate expectations, departed unlawfully from policy, thwarted the statutory purpose, failed to comply with the public sector equality duty and acted irrationally.

The challenge followed the temporary use of the Ibis Hotel for contingency accommodation. By the hearing, that use had ended and no new dispersed or initial accommodation had been procured in Coventry for some time. The court nevertheless considered the live issues concerning the legal significance of the 1:200 ratio, the Service User Demand Plan and the Bedspace Demand Plan, and the approach required for future accommodation decisions.

1. Academic issues. The challenges to consultation before using the Ibis Hotel and to the rationality of using that hotel were academic. The remaining issues concerned the continuing legal framework for future decisions and were properly determined.
2. Substantive legitimate expectation and policy. The repeated references to the 1:200 ratio did not amount to a representation that the ratio would never be exceeded. The statutory duty to accommodate destitute asylum seekers, unpredictable demand, the need to procure suitable accommodation and the absence of a fixed timetable for dispersal were decisive contextual matters. The statements could support an expectation, and policy, that the Secretary of State would continue working towards reducing numbers below the ratio, but not the absolute limit asserted by the Council.
3. The Service User Demand Plan and Bedspace Demand Plan were planning targets, not enforceable limits. The former identified planned accommodation needs for wider dispersal, while the latter allowed for occupancy and suitability constraints. Neither gave rise to the asserted expectation or policy.
4. The material relied on did not establish a representation or policy preventing all further procurement in Coventry, including contingency accommodation. The distinction between dispersed or initial accommodation and contingency accommodation was rational in view of the latter’s unpredictable and urgent demand.
5. Statutory purpose. Applying the Padfield principle, the relevant purpose of the accommodation provisions was preventing asylum seekers becoming destitute. Geographical dispersal was desirable but was not an object of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. Sections 100 and 101 did not establish otherwise, and section 97(1)(b) required regard to the availability of accommodation, which could operate against dispersal.
6. Equality duty and rationality. The Secretary of State had assessed the equality impacts when adopting the full dispersal policy and was taking practicable steps towards wider dispersal. Further repeated assessments would add nothing. The Council had not shown that the Secretary of State could realistically have acted differently, or that her approach was irrational in light of statutory duties, unpredictable demand, limited suitable accommodation and procurement delays.
7. The claim was dismissed.