Ricardo Benjamin Salinas Pliego & Anor v Astor Asset Management 3 Limited & Ors

Unethical acquisition of sensitive information from an opponent’s litigation solicitor can constitute abuse of process, regardless of whether the information is ultimately privileged or engages the iniquity principle. The court’s response must be appropriate and proportionate. Although strike-out may be justified where abusive conduct itself makes proceedings impermissible or threatens a fair trial, it is not automatically required for extra-procedural abuse. The court must balance protection of the integrity of civil litigation against the need to hold serious wrongdoers accountable. In an appropriate case, forfeiting a claimant’s right to seek summary judgment and ordering costs may be proportionate, while leaving the substantive claim to proceed. The future use and evidential status of illicit information may require a separate, granular review.

The claimants alleged that the defendants had fraudulently induced them to enter a stock-loan arrangement and had misappropriated shares. They applied for summary judgment on deceit and contract claims, alternatively for a conditional order requiring security.

The Astor Defendants cross-applied to strike out or stay the action for abuse of process or risk of an unfair trial. They also sought directions concerning information obtained after a private investigator, acting under a false pretext, elicited information from their litigation solicitor. A further application sought discharge of worldwide freezing orders.

The central issues were whether the claimants’ conduct constituted abuse of process, the evidential status and future impact of the information obtained, and the appropriate and proportionate response.

1. Abuse of process. The claimants had engaged private investigators to deceive and manipulate their opponent’s litigation solicitor into disclosing sensitive information. That conduct was abusive irrespective of whether particular information was privileged or whether the iniquity principle applied. Deliberately targeting an adversary’s solicitor to obtain litigation intelligence was contrary to the fundamental norms and values of civil litigation.
2. The claimants were legally responsible for and complicit in the conduct. The conclusion arose from the court’s inherent jurisdiction to protect its constitutional adjudicative function, rather than from a substantive analysis of agency, attribution or vicarious liability. Receipt, retention, review and deployment of the information compounded the abuse.
3. The solicitor’s disclosure did not necessarily destroy confidentiality or waive the clients’ privilege. The solicitor had been deceived and lacked authority to waive the clients’ rights. Determining the information’s precise evidential status required a topic-by-topic analysis of the transcripts, including the possible application of the iniquity principle and the relevance of public-domain material.
4. The court declined at this stage to strike out or stay the substantive action. The claimants had a substantial prospect of succeeding on the deceit claim, and the court had to balance procedural responsibility against substantive accountability for serious wrongdoing. The effect of the illicit knowledge on future fairness and the proceedings’ just disposal remained for a further hearing.
5. The summary judgment application was struck out of the court’s own motion under the inherent jurisdiction. Alternatively, summary judgment and a conditional order were refused in the exercise of discretion. The claimants had forfeited any right they otherwise had to seek summary judgment in the circumstances. The remaining applications concerning use of the information, injunctive relief and discharge of the freezing orders were adjourned to an Information Review Hearing. Permission to appeal and cross-appeal was granted.

The judgment records that an earlier application to discharge the worldwide freezing orders was refused by Calver J in [2024] EWHC 2522 (Comm). An appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal in [2025] EWCA Civ 1060. Those decisions were part of the same litigation and are not treated as cited authorities below.