Sahayb Abu v Secretary of State for Justice

A decision to remove a prisoner from association under rule 45 of the Prison Rules 1999 must be made by the governor and must involve consideration of the individual prisoner’s circumstances, including individual risk and medical needs. Cohort risk may be considered, but it cannot replace individualised assessment.

Decision-makers must obtain sufficient information about a prisoner’s mental health where prolonged segregation may worsen a known vulnerability. Prolonged segregation may breach Articles 3 and 8 where its cumulative effects cause intense mental suffering exceeding the unavoidable hardship of detention. The public sector equality duty applies to operational segregation decisions and requires macro-level consideration where a whole religious cohort is affected.

The claimant, a life prisoner convicted of preparing an act of terrorism, was held in a Separation Centre. Following a serious attack by another Separation Centre prisoner, he was removed from association under rule 45 and remained largely isolated for approximately six months.

He challenged the segregation on grounds including unlawful decision-making, failure to investigate his mental health, breaches of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, breach of the public sector equality duty and procedural unfairness. The claim was heard as a rolled-up judicial review hearing.

1. Permission and ground 1. Permission was granted on all grounds. Rule 45 of the Prison Rules 1999 permits consideration of cohort risk, but the decision must still address the individual circumstances and risk of each prisoner. The rule allocates continuing segregation decisions to the governor, while the Secretary of State authorises segregation beyond 42 days. The central steer was an operational decision, not a policy engaging the Lumba publication principle. However, from 1 May 2025, apart from the period between 27 May and 25 June, the decisions were in substance made centrally and merely implemented by governors. They were therefore unlawful, but relief was refused under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 because the outcome would highly likely have been the same.
2. Ground 2. A prisoner’s mental health is a relevant consideration under rule 45. Given the known history of trauma and the recognised risks of prolonged segregation, reasonable decision-makers had to obtain a proper assessment of the claimant’s mental health and the effect of segregation. Brief contacts and health screens did not discharge the Tameside duty. This ground succeeded.
3. Ground 3. Applying the cumulative assessment required by Ahmad and Shahid, the claimant’s strict and prolonged isolation, its duration, his vulnerability, worsening mental health and lack of timely structured assessment and therapeutic treatment amounted to intense mental suffering exceeding the unavoidable hardship of detention. Article 3 was breached from 21 August 2025, when he threatened self-harm. Article 8 was also breached because the interference was, for most of the period, not in accordance with law and, from that date, was disproportionate.
4. Ground 4. The Secretary of State failed to consider at macro level the equality implications of segregating a cohort consisting entirely of Muslim prisoners. The public sector equality duty was breached, although the omission would not have altered the substantive segregation decisions.
5. Ground 5. The claimant was entitled to meaningful disclosure, at least in gist, of the intelligence relied on in the segregation decisions. The failure to disclose the DRAM material was procedurally unfair, but relief was refused because disclosure would not have changed the outcome.

This was a first-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. Permission was granted on all five grounds. Grounds 2 and 3 were not transferred to the King’s Bench Division.