Klotho Brands Limited v Kevin-Gerald Stanford

A witness statement admitted in a Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 8 claim does not require verification on oath unless the court so directs. Verification by a statement of truth under Part 22 is sufficient, and a false verified statement may have contempt and criminal consequences.

The court may direct evidence to be given by affidavit, but a party cannot ordinarily obtain such a requirement retrospectively after failing to seek it at the hearing. An injunction must be obeyed unless and until it is set aside or materially varied. Later challenge to the injunction does not retrospectively eliminate contempt or liability for costs incurred through its breach.

The claimant obtained an injunction against the defendant in a Part 8 claim in 2022. The defendant later breached it, was found guilty of two contempts of court, and was ordered to pay the claimant’s costs.

The defendant applied for a stay of the costs order, and for restrictions on reliance upon an earlier witness statement, unless the statement and the certifying solicitor’s certificate were verified under oath. He argued that the statement was procedurally unsafe and inadmissible without sworn confirmation.

The application was determined on paper. The central issues were whether the applicable procedural rules required verification on oath, whether the evidence was admissible in the Part 8 proceedings, and whether a later challenge to the injunction could affect the defendant’s continuing liability.

1. Application dismissed. The defendant showed no good reason to stay the costs order or restrict reliance on the witness statement pending verification on oath.
2. Neither Civil Procedure Rules 1998 rule 32.10 nor Practice Direction 57AC required an admitted witness statement to be verified under oath. Rule 32.10 did not address verification. Practice Direction 57AC paragraph 4.1 required verification by a statement of truth under Part 22. A false statement so verified could expose the maker to contempt liability under rule 32.14 and potentially to an offence under section 5 of the Perjury Act 1911.
3. The court had power under rule 32.1(1)(c) to direct that evidence be given by affidavit. Practice Direction 32 paragraph 1.4 identified proceedings in which affidavits must be used. That power did not assist the defendant because no such direction had been sought or made in the original proceedings.
4. Retaining the claim under Part 8 meant that written evidence was the ordinary method of proof. Under rule 8.6, written evidence served under rule 8.5 could be relied upon, although the court could require or permit oral evidence. The defendant had not sought oral evidence, an affidavit, or cross-examination at the trial, and had not attended or challenged the witness statement.
5. The statement was verified by its statement of truth and was not procedurally non-compliant. Rule 32.5(1) also gave the court power to dispense with attendance for cross-examination. Since the statement had not been challenged, no hearsay notice was required.
6. The costs order resulted from the defendant’s contempts, which resulted from his own breaches of the injunction. Even if a later claim established fraud inducing the injunction, the defendant would remain liable for contempt committed while the injunction remained in force. An injunction granted by a competent court had to be obeyed unless and until set aside or materially varied.
7. The application was recorded as totally without merit under rule 23.12(a). The question of the claimant’s costs of the application and consequential assessment was left for written submissions.

The judgment records earlier first-instance decisions in the same proceedings: an injunction was granted on 5 April 2022; the defendant was later found guilty of two contempts; and sentencing and costs orders followed. This judgment determined the defendant’s subsequent application for a stay and related restrictions.