ATB, R (on the application of) v The Welsh Ministers

Judicial review claims must be brought promptly. The expiry of the three-month longstop in CPR 54.5(1) does not automatically justify an extension of time. Delay may prejudice good administration even without specific evidence of prejudice, particularly where important public policy decisions have been implemented. An extension requires a good reason, assessed in the circumstances of the particular claim.

A challenge based on the absence of a children’s rights impact assessment or consultation is insufficient where the claimant cannot properly explain how those matters could have affected the decision. The court may also refuse permission where it is highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. A later challenge to an amending instrument cannot be used to circumvent delay in challenging the principal instrument.

The claimant, a child represented by a litigation friend, renewed an application for permission to seek judicial review of two Welsh regulations restricting the prescription of puberty blockers by GPs and other primary-care practitioners.

The challenge alleged failures to have due regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child under section 1 of the Rights of Children and Young Persons (Wales) Measure 2011, and failures to comply with the public sector equality duty under section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. It also relied on the absence of a Children’s Rights Impact Assessment and alleged non-compliance with engagement provisions.

The first regulations had been made more than seven months before the claim. The second regulations widened an exception to cure an anomaly. The issues were whether time should be extended for the challenge to the first regulations and whether the challenge to the second regulations was arguable.

1. 2024 Regulations: Permission was refused because the challenge was brought out of time. The primary requirement under CPR 54.5(1) is promptness, and the court may extend time only where a good reason is shown. The claimant and his mother knew of the regulations relatively soon after they came into force, but the evidence did not provide a clear or adequate explanation for the delay. The later obtaining of legal aid explained only part of the period.
2. The absence of specific evidence of prejudice from the Welsh Ministers was, at most, neutral. Delay is inimical to good administration because public authorities require certainty about the validity of their decisions and actions. That consideration weighed against an extension, particularly in the context of public policy concerning children’s health and welfare. The claimant’s personal interest, public and political interest, and the general importance of the issues did not establish a good reason for extending time.
3. The merits did not justify an extension. The claimant had not properly explained how a Children’s Rights Impact Assessment or engagement under the Equality Act 2010 (Statutory Duties) (Wales) Regulations 2011 could have produced a different decision. The challenge relied on form rather than substance. The evidence showed that the welfare and best interests of children, and the interests protected by the public sector equality duty, were central to the policy underlying the regulations.
4. In any event, under section 31(3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, permission would have had to be refused if it appeared highly likely that the outcome for the claimant would not have been substantially different. The court could not see how the alleged procedural defects could have altered the outcome.
5. No 2 Regulations: The challenge was not arguable. Those regulations widened the relevant exception to cure an anomaly. The claimant’s real complaint concerned the underlying restriction imposed by the 2024 Regulations. He could not use a challenge to the amending regulations to overcome tardiness in challenging the original measure.

The renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review was refused.

This was a first-instance renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review. Eyre J had refused permission on the papers on 25 June 2025: the challenge to the 2024 Regulations was out of time, while the challenge to the No 2 Regulations was in time but had no real prospect of success. Mrs Justice Farbey refused the renewed application.