Olamide Jimoh v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Published immigration policies must be interpreted according to their objective meaning and applied consistently with their purpose. Under transitional discretionary-leave arrangements, an applicant who continues to qualify on the original basis and has completed the relevant period will normally proceed to settlement. A departure from that pathway requires a lawful and sufficiently reasoned new adverse development. Historic criminality already considered when discretionary leave was repeatedly granted cannot, without more, be relabelled as a fresh or compelling reason to refuse indefinite leave to remain. The medical claims policy reinforces that presumption where leave was granted because of serious illness. Decision-makers must also treat a child’s best interests as a primary consideration under section 55 of the Borders, Immigration and Citizenship Act 2009, including the practical consequences of the decision for the child’s status and family life.

The claimant challenged refusal of indefinite leave to remain. He had held discretionary leave since 2010 under transitional arrangements for the pre-July 2012 discretionary-leave policy and continued to qualify on medical grounds. The refusal relied principally on a 2006 conviction for supplying Class A drugs and a 30-month sentence.

After two earlier decisions and reconsideration, the defendant issued a third decision on 23 September 2025. The claimant argued that it misapplied the transitional discretionary-leave policy and medical claims policy, failed to comply with the duty concerning his daughter’s best interests, and was irrational. The central issue was whether historic criminality, previously considered without preventing further grants of leave, supplied a lawful basis to depart from the normal route to settlement.

1. Claim allowed. The decision dated 23 September 2025 was quashed. The only lawful course was to grant indefinite leave to remain, rather than remit the matter.
2. Published policy must be construed objectively, according to the meaning a reasonable and literate person would give it. The court agreed with R (Ellis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department. “Normally” preserves discretion to depart from the ordinary pathway, but that discretion must accord with the policy’s purpose.
3. The transitional policy required continuity through to settlement where the claimant continued to qualify on the same basis as the original grant. Departure could be justified by a new adverse development, such as a subsequent conviction. Reliance on the same 2006 conviction, already known and repeatedly assessed when discretionary leave was granted, was unlawful because no new development was identified.
4. The medical claims policy operated alongside the transitional policy. It created a strong presumption in favour of settlement after the qualifying period unless there was a compelling reason to refuse. Treating historic criminality as that compelling reason, without a new, aggravated or ongoing public-protection concern, was circular and inconsistent with the policy.
5. The defendant failed to discharge the duty under section 55 of the Borders, Immigration and Citizenship Act 2009. The assessment did not adequately consider the daughter’s practical immigration and nationality consequences. The unsupported suggestion of alternative care arrangements was irrelevant and undermined the reasoning.
6. Ground 1 was dispositive. It was unnecessary to determine the alternative irrationality ground.

The judgment does not state an appellate history. It records earlier judicial review proceedings and successive reconsidered decisions, culminating in the third decision dated 23 September 2025.