Brenda Hughes v Kirklees Council

A local authority deciding whether to transfer publicly operated care homes must base its comparison of in-house and external provision on legally sound material. Using a comparator figure that is two financial years out of date, without addressing that fact, may amount to a logical error or critical gap in the reasoning.

The authority is required to make only such inquiries as are reasonable. It need not model an unformulated alternative or assess every resident’s individual needs where services will continue and the relevant cost comparison is otherwise rational. The Public Sector Equality Duty requires a proper and conscientious focus on the statutory criteria, but the weight given to equality considerations remains for the decision-maker.

The claimant, a resident of Castle Grange, challenged Kirklees Council’s decision to transfer Castle Grange and Claremont House, specialist dementia care homes, to a private provider as going concerns.

She alleged irrationality and material error of fact, breach of the Tameside duty of inquiry, breach of the Public Sector Equality Duty, inadequate consultation, lack of promptness, and lack of standing in relation to Claremont House. The central financial challenge concerned the Council’s use of a £852.69 weekly comparator for external dementia provision, adopted in 2024 and retained for a 2025/26 decision.

1. Delay and standing. The February 2025 Cabinet resolution was a fresh decision following statutory scrutiny, fresh financial analysis and reconsideration. Time therefore ran from 11 February 2025. The claim was brought promptly and without undue delay. The claimant also had sufficient interest to challenge the single decision in relation to both homes.
2. Irrationality and material error. The Council was entitled to use an average rate based on payments for people with dementia generally. The evidence did not establish that the residents’ higher needs made that comparator irrational, and the court could not substitute a better comparison. However, continuing to use the £852.69 figure without addressing that it was two financial years old, while Cabinet considered 2025/26 budgeted costs and provider rates were rising, involved a logical error or critical gap in reasoning.
3. Tameside duty. The Council made the inquiries reasonably required by the decision-making stage. It was not obliged to model an unformulated non-sale proposal, investigate the causes of its overspend where that would only increase the apparent savings from transfer, or complete a detailed viability assessment that depended on the subsequent competitive process. It was required to update the external-cost comparator.
4. Equality and consultation. The Council’s Integrated Impact Assessment was imperfect but, read with the reports and proposed mitigation, demonstrated awareness of the potential adverse impact on elderly and disabled residents and active consideration of mitigation. The Public Sector Equality Duty was complied with. Consultation did not require presentation of an undeveloped alternative involving continued Council ownership, since that information was not necessary for meaningful responses.
5. Relief. Although the comparator error was established, the court concluded that it was highly likely that the outcome would not have been substantially different. The annual saving would still have exceeded £500,000, with other financial considerations remaining. Leave was therefore refused under section 31(3D) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The exceptional-public-interest exception was not engaged.