HM Attorney General v Paul Richards

Under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, a civil proceedings order may be made where a person has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious proceedings without reasonable grounds. The jurisdiction extends to proceedings in the County Court. Although the remedy is draconian, it is compatible with the right of access to court because the order operates as a leave filter rather than an absolute prohibition. Existing restrictions, including an injunction or Serious Crime Prevention Order, do not prevent a further order where they have not stopped the abusive litigation. Publication in the Gazette may be directed where necessary to protect others.

His Majesty’s Attorney General applied under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 for a civil proceedings order against Paul Richards, also known as Paul Parkin and other aliases. The application followed numerous claims brought under different names, principally concerning mobile-phone transactions. Most claims had been struck out or otherwise failed, and the respondent accepted the relevant evidence concerning his own activities.

The court considered whether the statutory preconditions were met, whether an order should be made in the exercise of discretion, the effect of existing restrictions and medical circumstances, and whether the order should identify particular aliases and be published in the Gazette.

1. Statutory preconditions. The evidence established that the respondent had habitually and persistently commenced proceedings in the County Court, an inferior court, without reasonable grounds. The proceedings were vexatious because they had little or no legal basis, involved an abuse of process, and imposed inconvenience, harassment and expense disproportionate to any likely gain. The conditions in section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 were therefore satisfied.
2. Discretion. The making of a civil proceedings order is draconian, but the authorities establish that such orders may be necessary to address persistent abuse of court process. The court was not entitled to go behind earlier orders or certifications that proceedings were totally without merit. The availability of a leave requirement prevents the order from stifling properly arguable litigation and makes the regime compatible with the right of access to court.
3. The existing Serious Crime Prevention Order was no bar because, in practice, it did not prevent claims being issued. The injunction imposed after the earlier adjournment had also failed to show that the respondent had abandoned his attempts to litigate. His age and medical conditions did not prevent a finding that the abusive litigation had been brought habitually and persistently.
4. The court exercised its discretion to make the order. It was appropriate to identify the respondent by the aliases supported by the evidence, while excluding Thomas Baker and Diane Bunkle because the Attorney General did not rely on claims allegedly brought in those names. Publication in the Gazette was necessary to protect others and was not shown to prejudice the respondent’s pending criminal proceedings.
5. The application was granted, subject to the amendments concerning those two names.

The judgment records that the proceedings had previously been before the Divisional Court on 29 January 2025, when an adjournment was granted and an injunction was subsequently in place. The present application was determined by the High Court (King’s Bench Division).