Thomas Williams, R (on the application of) v The Parole Board for England and Wales

A Parole Board decision refusing release is lawful where the Board applies the statutory public-protection test and its conclusion is reasonably available on the evidence. Disagreement with professional witnesses about the level or manageability of risk is not, without more, a mistake of fact. A mistake-of-fact challenge requires an established and objectively verifiable factual error, for which the claimant is not responsible, that materially influenced the decision. The Board may use its specialist expertise to assess risk from the whole evidential picture, while giving cogent reasons for rejecting professional opinions. Reasons need not entail the conclusion; they must show that the conclusion was reasonably available in light of the evidence.

The claimant, serving an indeterminate sentence for public protection, sought judicial review of the Parole Board’s refusal on 12 May 2025 to direct his release. He alleged mistakes of fact, irrelevant or overlooked considerations, inadequate reasons and irrationality. The challenge focused on the Board’s assessment that further psychological work concerning emotional regulation and relationships should be completed before release, despite professional evidence that risk could be managed in the community. The central issue was whether the Board had misunderstood the evidence or was reasonably entitled to conclude that continued confinement remained necessary for public protection.

1. The claim was dismissed. The alleged mistakes concerning intervention, core risk-reduction work, the claimant’s previous work with Ms Dodsworth, imminence of risk and the timing of further work were not established factual errors. The Board understood that further intervention was required and that some witnesses considered it could be undertaken in the community.
2. The complaint that the Board wrongly treated further psychological work as requiring completion in custody was a challenge to its evaluative conclusion, not a mistake of fact. Any confusion in the terminology appeared in the witnesses’ evidence, rather than in the Board’s understanding of that evidence.
3. Disagreement with professional witnesses about whether risk could safely be managed after release did not amount to a mistake of fact. The Board accepted that risk was not imminent, but was entitled to find that loss of self-control could occur at any time. The alleged distinction between work not starting immediately and a considerable delay before completion did not establish a material factual error.
4. The rationality and reasons grounds were considered together. Applying the approach explained in R (Wells) v The Parole Board, the question was whether the conclusion was reasonably available on the evidence, with due deference to the Board’s expertise and anxious scrutiny in a case involving detention and liberty.
5. The Board was entitled to assess the risk from all the evidence, including the latest recall, the absence of warning signs, the claimant’s continuing belief that he could engage in social drinking, and the fact that previous work had not prevented the later incident. The professional witnesses’ opinions deserved respect, but the Board had cogent and intelligible reasons for rejecting their assessment that interim community management was safe. Its conclusion under the statutory test was rational and justified.