D (Contempt: Breach), Re

Contempt requires deliberate disobedience of a lawful order, proved beyond reasonable doubt. The applicant bears the burden of proving that the respondent knew the order, understood what compliance required, acted or failed to act in breach, and was able to comply. Expert evidence directed to facilitating compliance does not necessarily address the separate question of whether the respondent could comply with the order. A mandatory obligation may found contempt, but a broadly worded obligation to use best endeavours may be too uncertain or perilous to support a finding of breach. The court must distinguish between those obligations.

The applicant sought to commit the respondent for breach of orders made by HHJ Hopkins KC and Mrs Justice Lieven DBE concerning the return of a child from Algeria to England. The orders required the respondent to attend the Algerian consulate and sign documents consenting to the child’s return with the mother. They contained penal notices.

The respondent admitted non-compliance but sought an adjournment pending expert evidence concerning the Algerian travel ban, the effect of a recent divorce, and possible criminal jeopardy in Algeria. The central issues were whether the expert evidence was material to the alleged breaches and whether the mandatory and best-endeavours obligations had been breached.

1. Breaches established. The court found beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent breached paragraph 3 of HHJ Hopkins KC’s order by failing to attend the Algerian consulate as required and sign the relevant documents. He also breached paragraph 4 of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE’s order, which required him to attend the consulate and make clear his consent to the mother returning to England with the child.
2. Expert evidence. The expert instruction concerned the steps required to address the Algerian travel ban and facilitate the child’s return. It did not address the respondent’s ability to comply with the lawful orders. The pending evidence therefore did not justify adjourning the determination of breach.
3. Contempt principles. The applicant bore the burden of proof, and the criminal standard applied. The respondent knew the terms of the orders, had been present and legally represented when they were made, and knew the facts making his conduct a breach. The court found that he was able to comply and had deliberately failed to do so.
4. Best endeavours obligation. The first part of paragraph 3 of Mrs Justice Lieven DBE’s order was mandatory. Its second part required the respondent to use best endeavours. Given the seriousness and peril of contempt proceedings, the court declined to find a breach of that best-endeavours obligation.
5. Disposition. The respondent was found in breach of the specified mandatory obligations. Sentencing was adjourned to 16 December 2025.