Alexander Isaac Hamilton v Mark Colin Barrow & Ors

Permission to appeal should be refused where the proposed grounds misstate the first-instance reasoning or disclose no real prospect of success. The modern approach to champerty requires the transaction to be assessed as a whole against relevant public policy, and recognises that an assignee’s interest need not be commercial or financial. Abuse of process is a broad merits-based evaluation. An appellate court should intervene only for material error, omission, impermissible reasoning or a conclusion unavailable to the judge. A new substantive argument should not ordinarily be introduced through post-hearing submissions, particularly where it has not been properly argued.

This was a consequential hearing following an earlier judgment in proceedings concerning assigned claims, champerty and abuse of process. The third and fourth defendants sought permission to appeal on grounds concerning the claimant’s interest in the assignments and the decision not to join them to an earlier action. The first and second defendants sought to raise in the Court of Appeal an alleged separate rule concerning assignment of bare causes of action. The court also determined costs and granted an extension of time for any renewed permission application.

1. Permission to appeal on champerty. The proposed ground had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for an appeal. The earlier judgment had applied the modern test, including recognition of non-commercial interests and assessment of the transaction as a whole against relevant public policies. The proposed ground partly misstated the factual findings and reasoning.
2. Permission to appeal on abuse of process. The decision whether proceedings constitute an abuse is broad and merits-based. The claimant was not contemplating the later proceedings when pursuing the earlier action, was acting without representation and was proceeding against legal advice. Those circumstances were sufficient. The claims assigned to the claimant were claims belonging to different people, and the defendants accepted that the assignors could have brought the same claims themselves. The proposed ground identified no error of principle within the recognised limits of appellate intervention.
3. Alleged separate assignment rule. The first and second defendants had not properly advanced a free-standing rule requiring a genuine commercial interest before assignment. The written and oral argument had focused on champerty. The Court of Appeal authority relied upon required further argument, and its actual decision concerned assignment to a legal adviser, a rule not relevant to the present case. The court therefore made no reliable determination on the point and did not permit it to be introduced through post-hearing submissions.
4. Costs and extension. Costs followed the event. The claimant’s costs were apportioned between the relevant issues as agreed. Summary assessment was not possible because the claimant’s preparation hours were disputed and unsupported by the time logs at the hearing; the amount was therefore to be assessed if not agreed. The third and fourth defendants were granted an extension until 4 pm on 10 November 2025 for any renewed application for permission to appeal.

The hearing followed an earlier judgment in the same proceedings, handed down on 10 October 2025. The third and fourth defendants were refused permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, subject to the extension granted for any renewed application.