Grainful Holdings Limited v Igor Mineev

Contempt for breach of a disclosure order requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the respondent knew the order, breached it deliberately, and knew the facts making the conduct a breach. The respondent need not appreciate that the conduct constituted contempt. The order is construed naturally and contextually, but restrictively because breach may be penalised. A complete failure to provide ordered information or documents may establish contempt where the respondent knew what was required and had no sufficient inability or self-incrimination basis. For contempt based on a false statement under affirmation, falsity, material interference with justice, and absence of an honest belief in the statement’s truth must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Ambiguous questioning, particularly of a non-native English speaker, may prevent that standard being met.

The claimant applied for findings of contempt against the defendant. The allegations concerned his complete failure to comply with paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of a disclosure order made on 22 October 2024, and an allegedly false answer given under affirmation at a CPR Part 71 hearing on 22 November 2023 concerning other debts.

The disclosure order required an affidavit containing extensive information about bank accounts, liabilities, assets, income and expenditure, together with supporting documents. The defendant accepted that he had not complied but relied on difficulties including closed accounts, psychological distress and lack of legal representation. In relation to the Part 71 answer, he said that he understood the question to concern debts in default or subject to enforcement. The issues were whether the elements of contempt were established to the criminal standard and whether the court was sure of the defendant’s state of mind.

1. Disclosure breaches. The court was sure that the defendant knew the terms of paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of the Disclosure Order. His correspondence showed that he understood both the deadline and the extent of the information and documentation required.
2. The court construed the order according to its natural and ordinary meaning in context, while applying the required restrictive approach to penal consequences. Although paragraph 1 was qualified by the defendant’s ability and paragraph 3 by possession or control, the defendant had provided no affidavit and no documents at all. He could at least have supplied information expressly required by paragraph 1, including explanations under paragraph 1(o) if documents were unavailable.
3. The defendant had never suggested that he was wholly unable to comply or that paragraph 2, concerning self-incrimination, excused compliance. His explanations did not account for the complete absence of compliance over the relevant period. The court was sure that he knew the facts making his conduct a breach and found contempt in relation to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4.
4. False statement allegation. The court considered whether the defendant knowingly made a false statement under affirmation at the Part 71 Hearing. The surrounding questioning focused substantially on debts in arrears. The final question was confusingly worded, and the court could not be sure that the defendant understood it as referring to debts that were not in arrears, or that he regarded the two loans in question as being in arrears.
5. The court was therefore not sure that the answer was false or that the defendant lacked an honest belief in its truth. No contempt was established in respect of that answer.
6. The court made a retrospective direction dispensing with personal service of the Disclosure Order, being sure that the defendant had actual knowledge of its terms. The question of sanction for the disclosure contempts was adjourned for further submissions and evidence.