DFL v General Dental Council

In determining apparent bias, the court must consider whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts in their overall context, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The observer is neither unduly sensitive nor complacent and does not adopt objectively unjustified assumptions. The assessment depends on the nature of the issue and must address both individual matters and their cumulative effect.

The independence and conduct of a regulatory tribunal’s legal adviser, the administrative involvement of witnesses, the remuneration of office-holders, and a representative’s work for more than one regulator do not establish apparent bias without evidence of a relevant conflict, influence or antipathy.

The appellant, a dental nurse, appealed under the Dentists Act 1984 against the Professional Conduct Committee’s decision to erase her name from the register for misconduct. The appeal was initially issued as a judicial review claim. Following procedural applications and directions, it proceeded as a statutory appeal.

The appellant alleged apparent bias arising from six matters, including the appointment and conduct of the legal adviser, the evidence of administrative staff, the handling of a witness’s remote attendance, correspondence by the Council’s chairman, the Council advocate’s firm also acting for the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and the funding of the Committee and legal adviser. The central issue was whether those matters, individually or cumulatively, created a real possibility of bias.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Professional Conduct Committee provided a fair, impartial and procedurally regular hearing. There was no real possibility of bias, either on any individual issue or cumulatively.
2. The governing test was whether a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered the facts in their overall context, would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. The observer was neither unduly sensitive nor complacent. The court considered the whole hearing while assessing each allegation separately and in combination.
3. The legal adviser was independent of the Committee. The transcripts showed that he declared relevant contact, explained his role, assisted the self-represented appellant fairly, and intervened to maintain order. His appointment and conduct did not give rise to apparent bias.
4. The hearing co-ordinator had a proper evidential role because he recorded and proved matters relevant to allegations against the appellant. There was no evidence that he controlled or influenced the Committee. The absence of his name from a later email reflected the Council’s use of anonymous email addresses.
5. The Committee had made substantial efforts to accommodate the appellant’s witnesses and the difficulties of a remote hearing. The chairman’s correspondence arose outside the disciplinary proceedings, terminated contact under the Council’s policy, and did not amount to interference. The asserted connection between the Council’s advocate’s firm and the Solicitors Regulation Authority was unsupported by evidence of conflict.
6. The fact that Committee members and the legal adviser were remunerated by the Council did not create apparent bias. Judicial and quasi-judicial office-holders remain bound to perform their duties impartially, and remuneration by the regulator was not itself relevant to that duty.
7. The judge made incidental observations that regulatory proceedings should be actively managed by narrowing charges where appropriate, identifying agreed facts, and considering whether inquisitorial or written procedures might assist unrepresented registrants. Those observations did not affect the conclusion that the Committee reached the correct decision.

The claim was initially issued as a judicial review claim. It was subsequently directed to proceed as a statutory appeal under the Dentists Act 1984. The court dismissed the appeal.