Professional Standards Authority for Health & Social Care v General Medical Council & Anor

Interim relief in a public-law appeal requires a real, rather than fanciful, prospect of success. Where mandatory relief is sought, a strong prima facie case is required. The court must then weigh the balance of convenience, including harm to the respondent, third parties and the public interest.

The High Court should respect a specialist tribunal’s evaluative judgment and should avoid effectively reversing its decision before the substantive appeal, particularly where an expedited appellate hearing is imminent.

The Professional Standards Authority appealed under section 29 of the National Health Service and Healthcare Professions Act 2002 against a General Medical Council review tribunal’s decision that James Gilbert’s fitness to practise was no longer impaired. It sought to have the decision quashed and remitted, and applied for interim suspension pending the appeal.

The issues included the High Court’s jurisdiction to grant interim relief, the prospects of success on grounds concerning insight, remediation and patient safety, and the balance of convenience pending related expedited proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

1. Application refused. The statutory scheme did not confer a specific power on the High Court to make an interim order pending determination of an appeal. Section 29(8) of the National Health Service and Healthcare Professions Act 2002 concerned final appellate orders. Sections 35D and 41A of the Medical Act 1983 did not provide the power sought.
2. The High Court nevertheless had general jurisdiction to grant interim relief under sections 19 and 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and CPR r 25.1. The applicable principles were those in American Cyanamid, modified for public-law proceedings.
3. The Authority had to show a real prospect of success. Because the relief was mandatory in substance, a strong prima facie case was required. Success had to include both establishing an appealable error and obtaining a final order changing the tribunal’s decision by substitution or remittal.
4. The Second Tribunal had correctly directed itself and had conscientiously evaluated insight, remorse, remediation, repetition, maintenance of skills and patient safety. The High Court had to show substantial restraint towards that specialist evaluative assessment. The tribunal was also bound to proceed on the basis of Calver J’s extant judgment unless and until it was overturned.
5. Although Ground 3 could not be treated as lacking any prospect of success because the Court of Appeal had granted permission on related issues, the Authority had not established a sufficient basis for interim suspension.
6. The status quo involved Mr Gilbert practising under his regulator’s determination. There was no evidence of actual patient harm, and the Court of Appeal hearing was imminent and expedited. Interim relief would effectively reverse the tribunal’s decision before full determination and cause substantial detriment to Mr Gilbert and his family. The balance of convenience therefore favoured refusal.

• High Court (Administrative Court): the Authority appealed against the Second Tribunal’s review decision and sought interim suspension. The application was refused.
• Court of Appeal: related appeals and cross-appeals concerning earlier disciplinary decisions had been granted permission and were listed for an expedited hearing on 15 January 2026.