Mahmod, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

A pre-tariff sift for referral to the Parole Board is lawful where it prioritises cases in which there is a provisional basis for concluding that the criteria for transfer to open conditions are met and that a positive recommendation is reasonably possible. The sift does not itself determine the prisoner’s final placement, breach the Tameside duty, unlawfully fetter discretion or operate irrationally merely because the Parole Board would conduct a fuller assessment. Procedural fairness does not ordinarily require a further opportunity to respond after a participatory sentence-planning review where the relevant concerns have already been addressed and the material is before the decision-maker. A decision-maker may rationally depart from a review meeting’s recommendation where it gives adequate consideration to the reports and identifies unresolved risk.

The claimant, a life prisoner serving a minimum tariff, renewed an application for permission to challenge the refusal to refer him for a pre-tariff review by the Parole Board. He also challenged the lawfulness of paragraph 3.4.11 of the Generic Parole Process Policy Framework, which governs pre-tariff sifts.

Permission had previously been refused on the papers by Linden J on 8 September 2025. The renewed application alleged that the policy was unlawful and that the individual decision was irrational, failed to take legally relevant matters into account, breached the Tameside duty and was procedurally unfair. The central issues were whether the sift threshold was lawful, whether the PPCS rationally rejected the SPRM recommendation, and whether further procedural opportunity was required.

1. Permission refused on all grounds. The renewed application for permission to bring judicial review was dismissed as unarguable.
2. Under Prison Act 1952, section 12(2), and rule 7(1) of the Prison Rules 1999, the defendant decides whether a prisoner is kept in closed or open conditions. For an indeterminate sentence before tariff expiry, section 239(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 gives the defendant a discretion to seek the Parole Board’s advice. The defendant is not obliged to accept the Board’s recommendation: R (Gilbert) v Secretary of State for Justice [2015] EWCA Civ 802, per Sales LJ at [70].
3. Paragraph 3.4.11 lawfully requires the PPCS to consider whether the three paragraph 5.8.2 criteria for open conditions are met and whether there is a reasonable prospect of a favourable Parole Board recommendation. The purpose is to prioritise cases likely to justify the detailed and resource-intensive Parole Board process. That threshold is rational and does not impose a duty to refer every case other than truly unmeritorious cases.
4. The policy does not authorise breach of the Tameside duty. The SPRM process gathers relevant material, and the policy does not prevent consideration of further material or additional inquiries. Nor is the policy an unlawful fetter, since it remains a policy subject to exceptional cases, including transfers without a Parole Board recommendation under paragraphs 5.5.1 to 5.5.3.
5. The PPCS was rationally entitled to depart from the SPRM recommendation. It considered the SPRM report, Dr Bamford’s report and character references, and identified the absence of core risk-reduction work, continuing high risk to the claimant’s surviving daughter, unresolved beliefs and attitudes, and unfulfilled caveats in the psychological recommendation.
6. Procedural fairness did not require the PPCS to put its views to the claimant in draft or provide a further consultation after the SPRM. The claimant had participated in that process and had addressed the relevant risk criterion. The sift was an administrative prioritisation decision, not a trial or a further hearing.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by Linden J on 8 September 2025. On renewal, Lang J refused permission on all grounds.