RA v PK

In determining child arrangements after established domestic abuse, the statutory presumption that parental involvement furthers welfare is subordinate to the particular risk of re-traumatisation. Indirect contact may properly be refused where engaging with the abusive parent would harm the child or primary carer, even without a present risk of fresh abuse.

A Children Act 1989 section 91(14) order may be made where renewed litigation itself creates a risk of harm, and may be limited to the period necessary to protect the child. In exceptional circumstances, parental responsibility may also be restricted so that the resident parent is not required to negotiate day-to-day decisions or facilitate access to information, subject to essential health notifications.

The father applied for child arrangements following an application under article 21 of the Hague Convention 1980. The mother opposed contact, sought a Children Act 1989 section 91(14) order, and sought restrictions on the father’s parental responsibility.

A previous Hague Convention return application had been refused after findings of serious domestic abuse. The father proposed a gradual progression from a letter to indirect and eventually direct contact. The mother and Cafcass opposed contact because of continuing trauma and the risk that renewed engagement would harm both the child and the mother.

The issues were whether contact should be reintroduced, whether further applications should be subject to a section 91(14) filter, and the extent and duration of restrictions on parental responsibility.

1. Contact. The father’s past conduct was violent, threatening and seriously harmful. The mother and child remained traumatised. The principal risk from indirect contact was not fresh domestic abuse but the psychological harm caused by requiring the child and her primary carer to engage with the father. The presumption in section 1(2A) of the Children Act 1989 therefore yielded to the particular circumstances. Contact was refused.
2. A letter from the father was permitted in principle, but it was to be held by the mother and given to the child when she asked about her father, so as to avoid delivery at an inopportune time and possible re-traumatisation.
3. Section 91(14). Under section 91A, the risk that a further application would cause significant harm to the mother and possibly the child justified a section 91(14) order. The father’s litigation history did not itself establish undue litigiousness. The order was limited until the child reached 13. The court did not prescribe completion of a domestic-abuse programme as a precondition because the suggested programme was unavailable.
4. Parental responsibility. In the extreme circumstances, it was unreasonable to require the mother to negotiate with the father about day-to-day management or to permit him access to information from the child’s school or GP. Restrictions preventing removal of the child from the mother’s care and limiting access to information were in the child’s best interests. The restrictions were to last until the child reached 16.
5. The court did not dispense with the father’s consent for matters covered by section 13, including changing the child’s name or removing her from the jurisdiction. The mother was required to ensure that the father was informed of significant life-changing, as well as life-threatening, medical conditions.

No appellate history is stated in the judgment. The court referred to earlier Hague Convention proceedings in which a return application had been refused.