E, Z, D, V (Welfare), Re

In determining child arrangements, the child’s welfare remains paramount. A parent’s involvement is presumed to further welfare, but that presumption yields where the evidence shows that contact risks emotional harm or destabilisation. Contact should be promoted through all reasonable and proportionate means, although the court is not required to authorise arrangements carrying disproportionate risks.

Where proposed travel is to a non-Hague country, the decisive question is whether removal would be in each child’s individual best interests. Safeguards, assurances and cultural benefits must be balanced against risks of retention, reduced oversight and damage to the children’s relationships with their primary carer. The court may refuse prospective leave where present circumstances are unstable and the issue can sensibly be reconsidered after a period of stability.

The proceedings concerned the welfare and future arrangements of four children who had lived in England and Wales since November 2022 after their mother brought them from Uganda without the father’s consent. The father sought child arrangements, direct and indirect contact in England and Uganda, parental responsibility for the youngest child, changes of name, retention of travel documents and protection against onward removal to a third State.

Following evidence from a Cafcass Family Court Adviser, the parties agreed structured video contact, twice-yearly direct contact in England, undertakings and related arrangements. The remaining disputes concerned travel to Uganda and a prohibited steps order preventing removal from England and Wales.

1. Welfare and contact. The court applied the welfare principle in Children Act 1989, s 1. The welfare of each child was paramount. The presumption that parental involvement furthers welfare was important but rebutted on the evidence of emotional manipulation, divided loyalties and destabilisation of the children’s home.
2. The court followed the established principles concerning promotion of contact. The court must consider and facilitate reasonable alternatives before abandoning contact, but the obligation is not absolute. Contact may be limited where necessary to protect welfare, and excessive weight should not be given to short-term difficulties. The agreed, structured contact in England provided a proportionate means of maintaining the children’s relationships with the father.
3. Proposed travel to Uganda. Uganda was not a Hague Convention country. The overriding question was whether temporary removal would be in the individual best interests of each child. The court considered the children’s Ugandan heritage and relationship with their father, but gave substantial weight to the risks of retention, reduced oversight, the father’s conduct during contact, and further harm to the children’s relationships with their mother and stepfather. The proposed safeguards did not sufficiently outweigh those risks.
4. The court therefore refused prospective leave to remove the children to Uganda. It considered it neither sensible nor prudent to grant leave in advance of a period of stability. The issue could be reconsidered after two years, or by a fresh application if agreement was not reached.
5. Other applications. The court endorsed the parties’ agreements and undertakings, including twice-yearly direct contact in England, structured video contact, inclusion of the paternal name for the three oldest children, information-sharing concerning the youngest child and removal of CCTV cameras. The applications for parental responsibility for the youngest child and a prohibited steps order preventing removal to a third State were dismissed. The children’s passports and travel documents were released to the mother, and the solicitors’ holding orders were discharged.

This was a final first-instance welfare determination. The court referred to its earlier decision refusing the father’s summary return application: E, Z, D, V (Inherent Jurisdiction: Refusal of Return Order), Re [2024] EWHC 988 (Fam).