Holly, Re

A local authority seeking to extend a deprivation of liberty order must demonstrate a continuing welfare purpose. The court will examine whether the accommodation, therapeutic support, education and care planning provided or proposed meet the young person’s assessed needs. Apparent periods of stability do not necessarily establish that those needs are being met, particularly where serious self-harm and risk-taking behaviour recur. Resource shortages and the absence of suitable placements do not remove the need for proactive planning and persistent searches for appropriate provision. Where an extension would serve no useful welfare purpose, the application should be refused.

Kent County Council applied to extend a deprivation of liberty order concerning Holly, a vulnerable young person with autism, foetal alcohol syndrome, emotional dysregulation, self-harming behaviour and suicidal ideation. Holly had been accommodated in successive unregulated placements while the local authority sought, inconsistently, therapeutic residential provision, education and appropriate mental-health support.

The grandparents, who held parental responsibility and had cared for Holly throughout her childhood, and Holly’s guardian criticised the local authority’s care planning, limited placement searches, lack of consultation and failure to secure the recommended therapeutic intervention. The central issue was whether a further seven-day extension of the order, until Holly’s eighteenth birthday, served any continuing welfare purpose.

1. Application refused. The local authority’s application to extend the deprivation of liberty order until Holly’s eighteenth birthday was refused because the judge saw no purpose to be served by the proposed seven-day extension.
2. The court accepted that Holly had complex and serious welfare needs, including a need for sustained therapeutic intervention, appropriate education and coherent transition planning. Dr Bentley’s recommendations for intensive dialectical behaviour therapy and a therapeutic residential placement had not been implemented at the required level.
3. The local authority’s response was, at best, reactive rather than proactive. Searches for suitable residential provision had been undertaken for only 53 days over a 72-week period. The authority had also ceased searching without properly explaining the decision and had repeatedly failed to involve or consult the grandparents, who held parental responsibility.
4. Periods when Holly appeared settled did not establish that her needs were being met. The history showed that apparent stability was repeatedly followed by serious self-harm or dangerous behaviour. Her refusal or inability to engage with services should have been anticipated by professionals dealing with a highly vulnerable young person and did not justify accepting inadequate provision.
5. The court acknowledged the acute shortage of specialist therapeutic placements and the difficulty of coordinating health, education and social-care services. Those difficulties did not excuse the failure to pursue appropriate provision with sufficient commitment, nor did they remove the local authority’s duties under the Children Act 1989 and the applicable care-planning framework.
6. The judgment criticised the local authority’s unwarranted attacks on the grandparents and guardian and concluded that Holly had been denied the opportunity to benefit from specialist care and therapy that might have improved her prospects.