Bank of India v Firestar Diamond FZE & Ors

A stay of civil proceedings is not warranted merely because a litigant in prison lacks the resources or technology available to the opposing party. The question is whether, despite proportionate case management measures, the conditions necessarily deprive the litigant of a reasonable opportunity to present the case fairly. Equality of arms concerns equality of procedural opportunity, not equality of resources.

Where the effect of imprisonment and lack of access to procedural rules, electronic documents or word-processing facilities remains uncertain, the proper course may be to adjourn the stay application to a pre-trial review and give interim directions. Speculative risks of criminal consequences or witness unwillingness do not justify a stay. Inspection of originals should be ordered where it is reasonable and proportionate, having regard to the Overriding Objective and CPR PD57A paragraph 6.4.

The claimant bank sued the third defendant on a personal guarantee after obtaining summary judgment against the first defendant borrower for US$8,475,272.95. The third defendant, detained pending extradition proceedings and appearing as a litigant in person, applied for a stay until the listed trial and for inspection of three original contractual documents.

He relied on his lack of internet, laptop and document-search facilities, the alleged inequality of arms under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and risks associated with contacting witnesses or obtaining evidence. The central issues were whether a fair trial could presently be assessed, what case-management measures were required, and whether inspection of the originals was reasonable and proportionate.

1. Stay application. The court had jurisdiction under Civil Procedure Rules 1998 Part 3.1(g) and section 49(3) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The power was discretionary and had to be exercised consistently with the Overriding Objective.
2. There was no general entitlement to a stay or adjournment because a party was imprisoned. Under Article 6, equality of arms required a reasonable opportunity to present the case without substantial procedural disadvantage. It did not require equality of financial or other resources. The court should ask whether, despite its best efforts, the conditions of imprisonment would necessarily prevent a fair trial.
3. The absence of access to the Civil Procedure Rules 1998, word-processing facilities, or searchable electronic documents could, depending on the circumstances, create an unfair procedural disadvantage. However, the evidence did not yet establish whether a fair trial in January 2026 would be impossible. The stay application was therefore adjourned to the September 2025 pre-trial review, when disclosure, witness evidence, expert reports, bundle size and the outcome of the defendant’s laptop application would be known.
4. Pending the review, the claimant was directed to provide hard copies of relevant guidance, disclosure, witness statements, expert reports and the current White Book, subject to an undertaking for care and return. Counsel was also directed to prepare a draft authorities list, including adverse authorities, for consideration at the review.
5. The alleged risk of further Indian criminal charges or prejudice to bail applications was speculative. Section 503 of the Indian Penal Code did not prevent the defendant from obtaining evidence or contacting witnesses for these proceedings. Witness unwillingness was an ordinary litigation difficulty and did not justify a stay.
6. Inspection application. Production of the three original contractual documents was reasonable and proportionate. The documents were few, readily available, central to the claim, and could be inspected without material disruption. A credible expert report could give a later amendment application a realistic prospect of success. Production was conditional on the expert confirming that she had been placed in funds and undertaking care and return of the originals.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier summary judgment against the first defendant borrower, but no citation for that decision is stated.