Spyridoula-Maria Armeniakou v James Alexander Scott Thomson

Further disclosure in support of a freezing order may be ordered where it is necessary, just and convenient to police the injunction. The same approach applies to information and documents. The court may require asset identification, including information concerning companies controlled by the defendant, where unreliable disclosure and a real risk of dissipation undermine the injunction’s effectiveness.

Historic disclosure must remain proportionate. The court should select a date range justified by the evidence. Disclosure concerning assets outside the territorial scope of the freezing order may still be ordered where it assists in policing the order and does not materially intrude on foreign proceedings.

A confidentiality club is exceptional. Irrelevant and truly sensitive personal information may instead be redacted. Additional fortification requires a serious issue to be tried as to causation and loss, together with a sufficient risk warranting protection.

The judgment concerned consequential issues following a worldwide freezing order made against the defendant, excluding assets located in Greece. The claimant sought further information and documents concerning the defendant’s assets, companies, dissolved companies and bank accounts.

The court also considered whether bank statements should be disclosed subject to a confidentiality club, whether further fortification should be ordered in respect of the freezing order, costs, and permission to appeal.

The central questions were whether the requested disclosure was necessary to police the freezing order, whether privacy and confidentiality required special measures, and whether the evidence justified additional fortification.

1. Further disclosure. The claimant’s application was granted, subject to two qualifications. There was no material distinction between applications for information and applications for documents. In both cases the question was whether disclosure was necessary, just and convenient to ensure that the freezing order was effective: HMRC v Malde and JSC BTA Bank v Ablyazov. The credible-material approach was applicable.
2. The defendant’s asset disclosure and evidence had been unreliable and misleading. There was credible evidence of a discrepancy in asset values, evidence of transfers through nominees, and evidence supporting a real risk of dissipation. The requested material was directed to asset identification, rather than merely asset tracing or obtaining evidence for a contempt application. Documentary verification was justified because reliance on the defendant’s account alone was inadequate.
3. The order could extend to assets of companies over which the defendant exercised de facto control. There was a real risk that company assets could be dissipated to reduce the value of the defendant’s interests. The principle in Lakatamia Shipping Co Ltd v Su applied. Disclosure concerning Greek assets was also justified. It assisted in policing the English freezing order and did not materially intrude into the role of the Greek courts. The order was therefore not inexpedient under Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, section 25(2).
4. The date for Category 1 information was the earliest date on which the defendant could have become aware of the order. For Categories 3–6, the appropriate starting date was 1 January 2024. The evidence did not justify going back to 1 January 2022.
5. Confidentiality and privacy. A confidentiality club was not justified. The claimant’s undertaking against collateral use, together with her assets and fortification in this jurisdiction, sufficiently reduced the risk of misuse. Solicitors could redact commentary revealing information that was both irrelevant to standard disclosure and truly sensitive personal information. The amount of each payment was not to be redacted. This approach was consistent with the overriding objective and Article 8 of the ECHR: Privatbank v Kolomoisky and Dalton Projects v Secretary of State for Transport.
6. Fortification. The court provisionally held that the threshold was a serious issue to be tried as to whether the injunction caused or would cause loss, and whether the claimant might be unable to compensate the defendant. Financial loss consequent upon reputational damage was not excluded in principle, but the loss had to be caused by the injunction. The evidence did not establish a seriously arguable causal case or provide an informed and realistic estimate of loss. Additional fortification was refused.
7. Costs and appeal. The defendant was ordered to pay 85% of the claimant’s costs of the freezing-order application, summarily assessed on the standard basis. Permission to appeal was refused because the proposed grounds had no real prospect of success and there was no other compelling reason for an appeal.

This was a first-instance consequential judgment following the freezing order and earlier judgments in the same proceedings. The judgment records that the Court of Appeal refused the defendant permission to appeal against discontinuance of the confidentiality club and discharged the stay.