Birmingham City Council v Mohammed Khalil & Anor

Contempt arising from breach of an anti-street-cruising injunction may warrant immediate custody where deliberate high-speed racing creates a very high risk of serious harm. The court should assess culpability and harm, taking account both of actual harm and the risk of harm. Significant mitigation and early admissions may reduce the sentence, but do not necessarily make a fine or deferred consideration appropriate. Suspension may be used to secure compliance with the underlying injunction. The sentencing guidance in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council and its use by analogy in street-cruising cases provide the appropriate framework.

The claimant local authority obtained an injunction prohibiting participation in street cruises within Birmingham. The defendants, who were persons unknown defendants within the injunction, admitted breaching it by driving at speeds exceeding 80 mph in 40 mph areas while racing with other vehicles.

The court considered whether contempt had been proved, the appropriate sentences, credit for the admissions, costs, and the effect of the defendants’ criminal legal aid. The central issues were the seriousness of the conduct, the applicable culpability and harm categories, the significance of actual and potential harm, and whether imprisonment should be immediate or suspended.

1. Contempt proved. The claimant bore the burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The defendants’ written admissions and the police video evidence established that each had participated in a street cruise by driving dangerously and at excessive speed while racing on the public highway. The conduct created danger to road users, a risk of property damage, and nuisance to others.
2. Sentencing framework. The court followed by analogy the guidance in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631, whose use in street-cruising cases had been endorsed by the Court of Appeal in Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355. Each case fell within culpability category B and harm category 2, at the higher end. The court assessed both the limited actual harm and the very high risk of harm inherent in high-speed racing on the public highway.
3. Penalty. The applicable starting point was one month’s imprisonment, with a range from adjourned consideration to three months. Despite substantial mitigation, including good character, first breaches, remorse, cooperation and early admissions, neither a fine nor deferred consideration was appropriate. Only custody could reflect the seriousness of the breaches. The appropriate sentence before credit was 42 days’ imprisonment for each defendant.
4. Maximum credit of one third for the admissions reduced each sentence to 28 days. Each sentence was suspended for 12 months on condition of compliance with the injunction or any amended form of it.
5. Costs. Each defendant was ordered to pay the claimant £3,630.32. The costs were payable notwithstanding criminal legal aid, because the defendants did not have the civil legal-aid costs protection under section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. Payment was ordered by monthly instalments of £200.