TYC, R (on the application of) v Birmingham City Council

Local authorities have no absolute duty to provide discretionary travel assistance to young persons of sixth-form age, including those with disabilities or special educational needs. Parents may generally be expected to accompany their child or make suitable arrangements. A parent’s working pattern alone will not normally constitute exceptional circumstances.

Nevertheless, the authority must act reasonably and consider the particular reasons advanced by the parent. It must not apply the general expectation as a blanket rule. Where a parent says that accompaniment would require giving up employment, and that no support network exists, those circumstances must be properly assessed. The authority may provide partial assistance where that would reasonably meet the child’s transport needs.

TYC, a sixth-form student with autism, an education, health and care plan and significant mobility and supervision needs, challenged Birmingham City Council’s decision concerning discretionary home-to-school travel assistance.

The Council had previously provided transport, but for the 2024/2025 academic year offered only the cash equivalent of a bus pass. It considered that TYC could be transported by his mother in a Motability car and that her work commitments did not justify further assistance.

The judicial review concerned whether the Council had rationally assessed TYC’s particular circumstances, including his mother’s status as a single parent and sole earner, her lack of a support network, and the practical consequences of requiring her to transport him.

1. The claim succeeded and the decision was quashed. The Council was directed to reassess TYC’s home-to-school travel package.

2. Under sections 509AA and 509AB of the Education Act 1996, there is no absolute obligation to provide transport for young persons of sixth-form age, including those with disabilities or special educational needs. Budgetary constraints are relevant, and parents may be expected to do more after the child reaches 16.

3. The Council was entitled to adopt a policy under which discretionary assistance would generally be limited to exceptional cases and a parent’s working pattern would not normally suffice by itself. The general expectation is that the parent will accompany the child or make other suitable arrangements.

4. That policy could not be applied as a blanket rule. The Council had to engage with the specific reasons advanced by the parent and decide whether, in the circumstances, it was reasonable to expect her to undertake the transport.

5. The Council misunderstood the evidence. TYC’s mother had not merely said that her working pattern required adjustment. She said that, as a single parent with no family support, she would have to give up her employment. The Council failed to consider that material fact and therefore acted irrationally.

6. The court could not refuse relief under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 198. The evidence showed that the outcome might have been substantially different if the Council had properly considered the claimed exceptional circumstances. The court also noted that partial transport assistance could have been considered, with other arrangements meeting the balance of TYC’s needs.