Colin Malcolm v Hart District Council

A planning decision will be unlawful only where the officer’s report contains a distinct and material defect which materially misleads the decision-maker or leaves the decision irrational. Reports should be read fairly and benevolently, rather than subjected to minute forensic scrutiny. The same approach applies to a delegated report, and may be applied with even greater benevolence because the report’s author is also the decision-maker. The court must not substitute its own planning judgment for that of the local planning authority. An issue not fairly raised in objections need not be addressed expressly in the report. A relocation of an existing business from another district may rationally be treated as a local economic or social benefit.

The claimant sought judicial review of Hart District Council’s decision to grant planning permission for the change of use of a commercial unit from office use to a dog grooming studio. His objections focused principally on noise affecting an adjoining annexe and garden, but also raised highway, planning-balance and policy issues.

The Council’s delegated report summarised the objections, assessed residential amenity, referred to relevant policies and statutory provisions, and recommended permission subject to conditions controlling operating hours and overnight keeping of dogs. Permission was granted on 14 June 2024. Permission to bring the claim was granted on all grounds by a Deputy High Court Judge. The central issue was whether the report contained a material legal or factual defect sufficient to invalidate the planning decision.

1. The claim was dismissed. The delegated report fairly and comprehensively recorded the claimant’s objections, including concerns about noise affecting the annexe, garden, vehicle movements and the rural setting.
2. Planning officers’ reports must be read fairly, with reasonable benevolence and without overly legalistic or hyper-critical analysis. Following R (Mansell) v Tonbridge and Malling BC and R (Bates) v Maldon DC, intervention is justified only for a distinct and material defect, such as material misdirection, a clear misunderstanding of policy, or an omission capable of affecting the outcome.
3. The same principles apply to delegated reports. Since the author of a delegated report is also the decision-maker, there is no risk that another decision-maker misunderstood the advice. A delegated report may therefore, if anything, be read more benevolently.
4. The officer was entitled to exercise planning judgment about the likely noise impact. The objection letters asserted that dog grooming was inherently and unacceptably noisy, but supplied only limited second-hand evidence. The report was not unlawful because it did not accept those assertions as established facts. The reference to the absence of substantial evidence was potentially curious, but read in context it did not disclose a material error.
5. The comparison with the former town-centre premises was permissible. It was used to assess whether the studio could coexist with nearby residential uses, not as a conclusion that town-centre conditions and the rural setting were identical. The three other appeal decisions were fact-sensitive and did not establish a determinative rule.
6. The traffic ground failed because the alleged noise from vehicle movements had not been clearly raised before the Council. The report was not required to address a reformulated objection advanced only in the judicial review. Although the recorded vehicle calculation probably under-recorded movements, the claimant had not shown that the error affected the legality of the decision.
7. The officer could rationally treat relocation of the existing business from Rushmoor Borough to Hart District as a local social and economic benefit. The planning-balance reasoning was lightly expressed but adequate.
8. The policy ground was unparticularised and added nothing to the other grounds. The report applied the correct statutory planning test and reached a conclusion falling within the range of lawful planning judgment. Any later statutory-nuisance investigation would be a separate matter.

The claim was a first-instance judicial review challenge. Permission to proceed was granted on all grounds by Mr CMG Ockelton, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, by order dated 4 October 2024. The claim was then dismissed by the High Court (Planning Court).