Piotr Bocianski v Poland

For stage 1 of the conviction-extradition sequence, the court must decide whether the requested person was convicted in their presence. A clear statement in the extradition arrest warrant that the person appeared in person at the hearing resulting in the decision may be taken at face value. An instructed lawyer’s attendance on the requested person’s behalf constitutes presence, even if the requested person was absent. Where the warrant and supporting material leave a material ambiguity, further information may be required. Conclusions adverse to the requested person under Extradition Act 2003 must be reached to the criminal standard.

The Appellant challenged an order for his extradition to Poland following his conviction and sentence for burglary offences. District Judge Clarke concluded that he had been convicted in his presence for the purposes of section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003 and ordered extradition.

On the rolled-up appeal, the Appellant argued that he had left Poland before the relevant conviction, that the extradition arrest warrant was ambiguous about the effect of a later sentence alteration, and that further information was required. He also sought to rely on fresh evidence concerning his absence from the Polish appeal hearing. The central issue was whether stage 1 of the statutory sequence was satisfied.

1. Appeal and permission. The appeal was not reasonably arguable and permission to appeal was refused. Permission was granted to adduce the statement and documents from Advocate Banach. Permission was refused for the vague and unsubstantiated Teampol letters.
2. Provincial Court proceedings. The extradition arrest warrant clearly stated that the Appellant appeared in person at the hearing resulting in the decision. Applying the principle in Cretu v Romania [2016] EWHC 353 (Admin), as reflected in Merticariu v Romania [2024] UKSC 10, the warrant could be taken at face value. The Appellant’s assertions and employment evidence did not undermine that conclusion.
3. District Court appeal. The later alteration of the sentence could have raised the question whether the appeal was merits-evaluative or merely automatic or arithmetical. The court did not need to resolve that issue. The fresh evidence established that Advocate Banach had been instructed by the Appellant and had represented him at the District Court appeal. Attendance by an instructed lawyer on the Appellant’s behalf amounted to presence: Cretu, §34(iii). Stage 1 was therefore satisfied.
4. Further information. The court rejected the submission that the material was ambiguous or confused so as to require an adjournment. Mutual trust and confidence supported the starting assumption that the requesting judicial authority understood and applied the relevant legal standards. The finding of presence through the instructed lawyer was fatal to the appeal.
5. Fair-trial context. No Article 6 value was undermined where a person who had pleaded guilty, been convicted and sentenced, chose to leave an appeal to their instructed lawyer, particularly where the sentence was reduced.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): District Judge Clarke ordered extradition on 6 June 2024 after concluding that the Appellant was convicted in his presence for section 20 purposes. Fordham J rejected the challenge and refused permission to appeal.