Stephen Yaxley-Lennon, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Segregation in prison is not automatically incompatible with Article 3 ECHR. The court must assess the conditions of detention holistically, including the purpose and justification of the measure, its duration, its effects, and the safeguards and facilities available to the prisoner. A regime imposed for protection and prison security, regularly reviewed, supported by medical monitoring, and materially ameliorated by time out of cell, visits, telephone access and other activities may fall below the minimum severity threshold.

Article 8 interference must be assessed proportionately, having regard to feasible alternatives and the risks created by the prisoner’s detention. Treatment arising from risks associated with political views is not direct discrimination merely because those views contributed to the risks.

The claimant, detained at HMP Woodhill following an 18-month sentence for contempt of court, sought permission to apply for judicial review of his continued segregation and treatment.

He alleged breaches of Articles 3, 8 and 14 ECHR, contrary to section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and argued that the segregation decision involved public law errors, including fettering of discretion. The claim concerned whether the conditions and continuation of segregation were arguable breaches of Convention rights and whether the Secretary of State and prison authorities had acted unlawfully.

1. Permission refused. The claim was not arguable on any pursued ground.
2. For Article 3, the court applied a holistic assessment of prison conditions, considering the purpose of segregation, the existence of specific justification, regular review, duration, punitive character, distress and hardship, and whether the regime exceeded the unavoidable suffering inherent in detention. Article 3 does not impose an absolute prohibition on segregation. The decisions here were taken for the claimant’s protection and to preserve the safety and good order of the prison, not to break his resistance or humiliate him. Specific intelligence supported the assessed risks.
3. The segregation decisions had been reviewed at the intervals required by rule 45 of the Prison Rules 1999, with recorded reasons and clinical input. The regime included approximately three hours out of cell daily, gym and shower access, visits, extensive telephone access, work, chaplaincy contact and daily healthcare monitoring. Alternatives had also been carefully considered and rejected for safety, security and management reasons. The regime was therefore not properly characterised as solitary confinement, and no Article 3 breach was arguable.
4. The segregation constituted an interference with Article 8 rights, but it was proportionate. There was no obvious feasible detention arrangement causing a lesser interference in light of the custodial sanction and the risks associated with the claimant. Restrictions on campaigning through visits and calls were also justified.
5. The Article 14 complaint disclosed no direct discrimination. The operative reason for segregation was risk, not political ideology. Any possible indirect discrimination was unsupported by evidence and, in any event, would have been proportionate.
6. The fettering argument failed. The Governor’s letter expressly maintained that segregation was under review, subsequent reviews occurred, and the Secretary of State retained discretion because leave was required for continued segregation beyond each prescribed period.