Josephine Hayes v Dr Mark Pack & Ors

Permission to appeal requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason. A private contractual claim concerning membership of an unincorporated association cannot be transformed into a public-law challenge to the association’s governance or maladministration. Constitutional terms cannot ordinarily be incorporated through an ordinary conference motion where the constitution prescribes an entrenched amendment procedure and the motion lacks contractual clarity. Representation and joinder must serve the issues actually in dispute; the court is not required to add absent members who have made no application. An appeal does not automatically stay proceedings, and an adjournment dependent on permission being granted will fail when permission is refused.

The claimant, a member of the Liberal Democrats, was expelled following a complaints process. She brought a contractual claim against the respondents concerning her expulsion and sought reinstatement, damages and wider relief concerning the Party’s governance and complaints procedure.

A Master struck out parts of the particulars of claim, entered summary judgment on part of the claim and confined the action to the core breach-of-contract dispute. He later refused applications concerning representation, amendment of the relief and related procedural matters. Sir Stephen Stewart, sitting as a High Court judge, refused permission to appeal on the papers. The claimant renewed permission applications in two appeals and sought an adjournment of the trial.

1. Permission test. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, permission required a real prospect of success or some other compelling reason. An appeal would be allowed only if the lower decision was wrong or unjust because of serious procedural or other irregularity. None of the grounds met that threshold.
2. Nature of the claim. The proceedings were a private-law contractual claim concerning the claimant’s expulsion from an unincorporated association. They were not judicial review or a public-law investigation into the Party’s governance. The Master was entitled to confine the case to whether the disciplinary process and expulsion breached the membership contract.
3. Constitutional amendment. The Party’s constitution required a two-thirds majority for alteration. The ordinary conference motion relied upon did not satisfy that mechanism and contained expressions of belief, recommendations and conference notes rather than clear contractual language. There was no arguable basis for implying or incorporating an independent complaints-procedure term.
4. Representation and joinder. The claimant produced no evidence that other members sought to join. Other members could apply to be joined, but the court was not required to add representatives or arrange separate representation for persons who had made no application. Their involvement was not necessary to resolve the claimant’s expulsion dispute, and the proposed wider claim raised potential conflicts of interest.
5. Other procedural grounds. An appeal did not operate as an automatic stay. The representation arguments and proposed amendments were disproportionate and unrelated to the pleaded contractual claim. The application to adjourn the trial depended on permission being granted and therefore failed.
6. Disposal. Permission to appeal was refused on all seven grounds in each appeal. The adjournment application was dismissed. PTR costs were costs in the case, subject to the directions concerning costs reasonably incurred in the adjournment application.

1. High Court (King’s Bench Division): The Master’s judgments of 8 May and 22 July 2024 were challenged. Sir Stephen Stewart, sitting as a High Court judge, refused permission to appeal on the papers.
2. High Court (King’s Bench Division): On renewal, Dexter Dias J refused permission to appeal in both appeals on all grounds and dismissed the contingent application to adjourn the trial.