C (A Child: International Relocation), Re

International relocation to a non-Hague Convention country is determined by the child’s welfare as the paramount consideration. The court must undertake a holistic, comparative evaluation of the competing relocation plans, including the effect on the child’s relationships with both parents, the practical safeguards available, and any difficulties in enforcing or progressing contact abroad.

Completion of an accredited domestic-abuse perpetrator programme is not an essential precondition to progressing contact. The decisive question is whether meaningful and sustained change has occurred and whether residual risks can be safely managed. Where the evidence is incomplete, contact should not progress merely because relevant work has been undertaken.

The child, aged eight, lived in the sole care of his mother in England under a lives-with order. Earlier proceedings had resulted in findings of serious domestic abuse against the father and an order for monthly indirect contact.

The mother accepted employment in Dubai and moved there with the child without obtaining the father’s consent or the court’s permission. The father sought summary return, progression of contact, and related protective orders. The mother sought retrospective permission for permanent relocation. Dubai is not a Hague Convention state, and expert evidence addressed the availability and practical operation of its family courts.

The central issues were whether relocation was in the child’s best interests, whether contact could safely progress, and how the loss of English court oversight should be addressed.

1. Relocation granted. The mother was permitted to relocate permanently with the child to Dubai. The father’s application for progression of contact was adjourned for further assessment and sustained indirect contact. The home address was kept confidential, but the child’s school could be disclosed.
2. Dubai was a non-Hague Convention state. The court therefore applied the welfare principle under the Children Act 1989, rather than any automatic return principle. The child’s welfare remained paramount. The court conducted a holistic and non-linear comparative evaluation of the proposed life in Dubai and a return to London, taking account of the child’s Article 8 rights, the parents’ Article 8 rights, and the importance of maintaining family relationships.
3. The relocation offered substantial welfare benefits. The mother would have improved financial security, accommodation, healthcare and employment, while the child would receive a stable home, education and increased time with his primary carer. A return would cause serious educational, financial and emotional disruption. The existing indirect contact could be facilitated from Dubai and relocation would therefore have minimal immediate effect on the father-child relationship.
4. The court accepted that relocation created significant vulnerability because enforcement and future contact applications might require proceedings in Dubai. The expert evidence indicated that the father could apply to the Dubai courts, but the changing law and unfamiliar legal system made that process difficult. Those concerns were important in the welfare balance but did not outweigh the advantages of relocation. Maintaining the English proceedings provided proportionate continuing oversight.
5. Following findings of domestic abuse, contact had to be assessed under PD12J. Completion of a RESPECT-accredited domestic-abuse perpetrator programme was not an indispensable condition of progression. Such a programme was a means to achieving meaningful and sustained change. However, the court lacked a robust assessment showing that the father’s work had reduced the risks to a safe and manageable level. His continued denial of a later incident, inconsistent financial support and lack of sustained indirect contact justified retaining the existing arrangements.
6. The father’s application to adjourn for further expert evidence was refused. Further evidence was not necessary under Part 25 of the FPR 2010 and would cause disproportionate cost and delay.

First-instance decision of the High Court (Family Division). The judgment does not state any prior appeal.