R v Kane Farrell

Whether a sentencing hearing was a Newton hearing for remuneration purposes is fact-sensitive. Live evidence and formal listing as a Newton hearing are not essential. The decisive question is whether the court resolved a substantial factual dispute relevant to sentence, rather than interpreting largely agreed facts or drawing inferences during mitigation. Submissions which seek to place a defendant more favourably within the sentencing guidelines will not, without more, establish a Newton hearing. Where the alleged dispute would not alter the offence category and the evidence is not tested, the hearing remains a sentencing hearing and attracts the applicable cracked-trial remuneration.

The appellant solicitors represented a defendant who pleaded guilty to drug-related counts and was sentenced after disputes arose about the quantity of cocaine attributable to him. They claimed a trial fee on the basis that the sentencing hearing was a Newton hearing. The determining officer allowed only a cracked-trial fee. The appeal concerned whether the judge had determined a factual dispute, or had merely interpreted largely agreed evidence and drawn inferences from cash recovered.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The applicable question under the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 was whether a Newton hearing had taken place.
2. The court accepted that the issue was fact-sensitive. A hearing need not involve live evidence or be formally listed as a Newton hearing. Those matters are relevant but not determinative, as recognised in R v Hoda and R v Makengele.
3. The relevant distinction was between resolving a factual dispute and interpreting or drawing inferences from undisputed or substantially agreed facts. The authorities discussed in R v Davies and R v Cobb supported maintaining a meaningful threshold, so that ordinary mitigation submissions did not become remunerable Newton hearings.
4. Here, there was wide agreement about the factual matrix and the accepted deliveries did not exceed the admitted 2.5 kilograms. The prosecution’s higher estimate was principally an inference from £160,000 in cash and its approximate cocaine value. The defence offered an alternative explanation based on puppy breeding and other income.
5. The submissions were limited, the alleged difference would not change the offence category, and neither side’s account was tested in a way requiring findings of fact. The judge had instead drawn or considered inferences relevant to the sentencing range. The threshold for a Newton hearing was therefore not met, and the determining officer correctly assessed the case as a cracked trial followed by sentencing.

1. High Court (Senior Court Costs Office): appeal against the determining officer’s remuneration decision dismissed.