Port of Sheerness Limited v Swire Shipping PTE Limited

A period toll payable where a vessel remains alongside for longer than necessary to load or discharge ordinarily applies to a vessel that remains after actual completion of the operation. It does not, without clearer wording, apply merely because discharge takes longer than estimated or expected.

Contractual provisions permitting additional charges for exceptional cargo-handling conditions require actual additional costs or expenses. They do not confer a general power to impose a charge representing the economic value of berth space. Where the contract specifies the circumstances in which additional charges are payable, a quantum meruit is unavailable for circumstances outside that contractual scheme.

The claimant operated the Port of Sheerness. The defendant’s vessel discharged hardwood cargo whose poor stowage caused delay, additional handling work and movements between berths. The defendant paid the additional stevedoring, shifting and equipment charges but disputed a period toll of £248,026.22.

The claimant relied on the Port Charges, the trading terms, an alleged supplemental agreement, and a quantum meruit. It also claimed statutory trebling of the toll under the Medway Ports Authority Act 1973. The central issues were whether the contractual period toll applied, whether other contractual or quasi-contractual routes established liability, and whether statutory remedies were available.

1. Claim dismissed. Judgment was entered for the defendant.
2. Clause 5(4) of the Port Charges formed part of the contractual scheme of dock charges. Read in context, the words requiring a vessel to remain alongside for longer than necessary referred to overstaying after actual loading or discharge had finished. They did not refer to a vessel taking longer than estimated or objectively expected to complete the operation. The alternative construction would be uncertain, difficult to apply and susceptible to misuse.
3. The quotation did not create a freestanding unilateral power to impose additional charges. It pointed to the detailed trading terms. Those terms allowed recovery of actual additional costs, charges and expenses incurred because of the condition of the cargo or the manner of working. A period toll representing the economic value of berth space was not such a cost or expense.
4. The February email exchange did not alter the result. It referred to the existing period toll in clause 5(4), which did not apply to the circumstances. A shared mistake about the contractual effect of that provision could not change the contract.
5. The contractual allocation of charges left no room for a quantum meruit. The parties had stipulated the circumstances in which additional charges were payable, and those circumstances did not include the claim advanced.
6. In the alternative, the Port had represented that the costs of shifting between berths were the stated shifting costs. Reasonable reliance would have ended when the period toll was first expressly mentioned. If the toll had applied, recovery would therefore have been limited to four days.
7. The court declined to decide finally whether the toll was unreasonable under section 60(2)(a) of the Medway Ports Authority Act 1973 or a penalty. It observed provisionally that the penalty rule was engaged, but expressed no view on whether the toll was exorbitant or out of proportion.
8. The statutory trebling provision did not apply. Under sections 3 and 64, the relevant charges had to be payable under an enactment. The period toll was payable under contract, although the power to impose charges was statutorily derived.