Nebahat Evyap Isbilen v Selman Turk

Criminal legal aid available in civil contempt proceedings remains criminal legal aid for statutory purposes. Where legislation defines “criminal proceedings” by reference to prescribed proceedings, that definition applies to related recovery regulations unless a contrary intention appears in those regulations. The absence of an express exception for first-instance civil contempt proceedings does not displace the statutory meaning.

For a recovery of defence costs order, “capital” includes a resource of a capital nature even where the asset is frozen or subject to an unresolved proprietary claim. The court may determine the contribution but suspend enforcement, and give liberty to apply, so that later developments concerning ownership or realisation can be accommodated.

The Legal Aid Agency sought a recovery of defence costs order against Selman Turk for criminal legal aid provided in committal proceedings arising from alleged breaches of a freezing order. The committal proceedings were technically civil, but criminal legal aid was available under Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 and the associated regulations.

The principal issue was whether the committal proceedings were “criminal proceedings” and therefore “relevant proceedings” under the Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013. A further issue concerned whether a frozen Pennsylvania property, subject also to competing proprietary claims, counted as Turk’s capital and whether enforcement should be postponed.

1. Jurisdiction to make an order. The committal proceedings fell within the statutory definition of “criminal proceedings”. Section 14(h) of Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, read with regulation 9(v) of the Criminal Legal Aid (General) Regulations 2013, prescribed proceedings involving determination of a criminal charge for Article 6 purposes. The proceedings therefore fell within “relevant proceedings” under regulation 2 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Recovery of Defence Costs Orders) Regulations 2013.
2. Section 11 of the Interpretation Act 1978 imported the statutory meaning of “criminal proceedings” into the Recovery Regulations. The explanatory note, practice direction, other LASPO regulations, perceived anomalies and the absence of previous applications did not establish a contrary intention. A practice direction could not alter the meaning of the statutory instrument. Any remaining anomalies were matters for Parliament or the Civil Procedure Rules Committee.
3. Capital and exceptions. “Capital” under regulation 2 meant every resource of a capital nature. The Pennsylvania property retained that character despite the freezing order and unresolved proprietary claims. The court was entitled to proceed on the basis of Turk’s asserted ownership. Regulations 10 and 11 did not require exclusion of the property, and neither unreasonableness nor exceptional financial hardship was established.
4. Form of order. The appropriate contribution was £390,000. The court could use CPR 3.1(1)(m), because the proceedings remained civil in technical character, to suspend enforcement until the freezing order was lifted and Mrs Isbilen’s proprietary claim determined. Turk was given liberty to apply so that liability would not exceed the proper value of his equitable interest, if any.

The judgment records that the claimant’s earlier committal proceedings succeeded substantially and resulted in a 12-month sentence: [2024] EWHC 565 (Ch). Turk’s appeal was allowed only to the extent that the sentence was suspended; otherwise it was dismissed: [2024] EWCA Civ 568. The present judgment determined the Legal Aid Agency’s first-instance costs application.