Fiona Ford, R (on the application of) v Coventry Magistrates' Court

A magistrates’ court has a wide discretion to adjourn proceedings, including proceedings for a closure order. The governing question is whether the refusal produces procedural unfairness, assessed in the particular circumstances and with respect for the need for expedition. Procedural unfairness is distinct from irrationality, although the two grounds may overlap. Judicial review may be available for procedural unfairness in magistrates’ court proceedings even where an appeal exists. Where an unrepresented occupier faces a serious risk to her home, has acted promptly to obtain representation, and a short adjournment could preserve the closure notice while enabling representation, refusal of an adjournment may be unfair and irrational.

Warwick District Council obtained a closure order under section 80 of the Antisocial Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 against premises occupied by Fiona Ford and her two sons. The magistrates’ court refused an adjournment sought to enable Ms Ford’s solicitors to obtain legal aid and attend. The hearing proceeded with Ms Ford representing herself, and a three-month closure order was made.

Ms Ford sought judicial review on the ground that refusal of the adjournment was unreasonable and breached her Article 6 rights. The issues were whether the claim was academic, whether an appeal to the Crown Court was an adequate alternative remedy, and whether refusal of the adjournment rendered the proceedings unfair or irrational.

1. The claim was not academic when commenced or when permission was granted. Although the closure order had expired by the hearing, that later development was relevant to relief and costs but did not prevent determination of the merits.

2. Judicial review remained available notwithstanding the statutory appeal to the Crown Court. Procedural impropriety or unfairness in magistrates’ court proceedings may justify judicial review even where an alternative remedy exists. The adequacy of a Crown Court appeal was also debatable because it was uncertain whether the Crown Court could suspend a closure order pending appeal. The observations in Chief Constable of Humberside Police v Kelly Morgan concerning such a power were expressly obiter and tentative.

3. A magistrates’ court has a wide discretion to adjourn. The reviewing court must respect the context and the possibility that more than one outcome may be fair. The question of procedural fairness is distinct from irrationality, although the grounds are closely connected.

4. Relevant factors included Ms Ford’s prompt efforts to secure representation, the absence of fault or delay, the importance of the proceedings and the risk to her home, the potentially contentious hearsay evidence, and the statutory power to adjourn for up to 14 days while keeping the closure notice in force. Countervailing considerations included the need for expedition, the commencement of the hearing, Ms Ford’s presence and ability to give evidence, and the court’s wide discretion. The hearing had progressed only to opening and some evidence-in-chief, so the prejudice from an adjournment was limited.

5. Considering the circumstances in the round, refusal of the adjournment forced an occupier at risk of losing her home to proceed without legal representation despite her reasonable efforts to obtain it and despite available means of limiting delay. The proceedings were therefore unfair. The decision was also outside the range of decisions open to the magistrates acting rationally. The closure order was quashed.

The judgment records that the closure order was made by Coventry Magistrates’ Court on 7 August 2024. Interim relief was granted by HH Judge Simon on 16 September 2024, and permission for judicial review was granted by HH Judge Richard Williams on 9 October 2024. The High Court (Administrative Court) subsequently allowed the claim and quashed the closure order.