West Suffolk Council v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities & Ors

In a statutory review of a planning decision, the court applies ordinary statutory meaning in context while respecting the decision-maker’s planning judgment. The phrase “principally to visiting members of the public” in Class E(e) of the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes) Order 1987 is fact-sensitive. It does not require services to be available to casual passers-by or people walking in off the street. Appointments, referrals and other administrative arrangements do not, without more, prevent users from being visiting members of the public. Class E(g)(ii) covers research or development, or both, of products or processes. Research papers may themselves be products of research, but an alternative evidential basis may suffice. The court must avoid excessive legalism and may not review the planning merits.

The Council sought statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 of an Inspector’s decision allowing an appeal and granting the owner of a former animal-health research centre a lawful development certificate. The certificate covered use of the site for Class E purposes, including specialist veterinary clinical services and research and development.

The Council alleged that the Inspector had misinterpreted Class E(e), because treatment was available only following referral and appointment, and Class E(g)(ii), because some research advanced knowledge without directly producing a product or process. Permission for the claim was granted at the rolled-up hearing. The central issues were the proper construction of those provisions and whether the Inspector’s conclusions were legally flawed.

1. Statutory review. The court granted permission but dismissed the claim. Section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 applies the ordinary public-law grounds of review. The exercise of planning judgment and the weighing of issues remain matters for the decision-maker, not the court. The court must avoid excessive legalism and hypercritical dissection of an Inspector’s decision letter.
2. Class E(e). The natural and ordinary meaning of “principally to visiting members of the public” is applied to the facts with planning judgment. It is not a general requirement that services be available to people passing by or walking in off the street. The phrase is compatible with registration, appointments and referrals. A person is not visiting as a member of the public where attendance depends on a particular affiliation, relationship or position, such as club membership or employment. Specialist veterinary services provided following referral were therefore within Class E(e). The Inspector had correctly distinguished the restricted membership arrangement in Thurrock and applied the principle in Kalra.
3. Class E(g)(ii). “Research and development” includes research or development, or both, and the work must be of products or processes. The statutory conjunction “and” is ordinarily conjunctive and disjunctive in this context. The evidence supported the finding that the research was directed ultimately to animal-health products and processes. Publication of research could also contribute to their development elsewhere. A research paper may be a product of research, and any possible error on that point would not have affected the result because the other findings independently supported the Inspector’s conclusion.
4. The Inspector was entitled, as a matter of fact and degree, to find that both clinical services and research and development were primary uses falling within Class E. Both grounds failed, and the claim for statutory review was dismissed.

The judgment is a first-instance statutory review. It records that permission was initially refused on the papers, then the renewed application was adjourned for a rolled-up hearing. Permission was granted at the hearing, but the substantive claim was dismissed.