Stephanie Croft, R (on the application of) v Torridge District Council

A planning policy must be interpreted objectively according to its language and context. The court must not add words, substitute different wording or delete words to produce a preferred planning outcome. Whether a policy has been correctly interpreted is a matter of law, distinct from the planning judgment involved in applying it. A decision based on a material misinterpretation is unlawful. A planning authority cannot rely on an earlier, potentially incorrect interpretation to establish that the outcome would probably have been the same under section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

The claimant sought judicial review of Torridge District Council’s decision to grant planning permission for two dwellings on part of a six-hectare housing allocation adjoining Pitt Hill, Appledore. The sole ground was that the Council had misinterpreted Policy NOR07(2)(c) of the North Devon and Torridge Local Plan concerning vehicular access from Pitt Hill.

The Council argued that the policy addressed access to Pitt Hill from Wooda Road, or alternatively imposed only a minimum requirement and did not limit the number of accesses. The central issue was the objective meaning and legal effect of the phrase requiring vehicular access by improvement to Pitt Hill and an access from Pitt Hill Road.

1. Claim allowed. The planning permission was unlawful and was quashed.
2. Policy NOR07 applied to the whole allocated site, including the claimant’s site, notwithstanding its division between different landowners and applications. Its access requirements were site-specific development principles applicable to development coming forward within the allocation.
3. The interpretation of the policy was a matter of law. Applying Tesco Stores Limited v Dundee City Council [2012] UKSC 13, the words had to be given their objective meaning in context. The phrase “an access from Pitt Hill Road” referred to access from Pitt Hill to the allocated site, or part of it. It did not merely concern access from Wooda Road to Pitt Hill.
4. The reference to “an access” meant one access. Reading the policy as permitting an unlimited number of accesses was inconsistent with the policy’s context, including the requirement to minimise loss of landscape character and the supporting text concerning the Devon hedges. The court could not rewrite the policy by adding, substituting or deleting words: see Corbett v Cornwall Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1069.
5. The officer’s report materially misinterpreted the policy. The error was not a matter of planning judgment and infected the committee’s decision. The court inferred that the committee adopted the report’s reasoning, applying R. (Mansell) v Tonbridge & Malling BC [2017] EWCA Civ 1314.
6. It was not highly likely that the decision would have been the same without the error. The highways authority’s response indicated that an alternative shared-access arrangement might have been preferred. The Council could not rely on earlier permissions for multiple accesses, granted under the same mistaken interpretation, to satisfy section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. That approach was inconsistent with R. (Gill) v London Borough of Brent [2021] EWHC 67 (Admin).

First-instance judicial review. Permission to bring the claim was granted on 5 August 2024. No appeal history was stated.