Ocean Outdoor UK Limited v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Ors

In a planning appeal determined by written representations, fairness does not generally require an Inspector to invite further evidence merely because an appellant’s case is unsubstantiated or not accepted. Parties must normally submit all material on which they rely, particularly where the disputed issue was known, the appellant was professionally represented and a detailed statement of case was provided.

The Inspector retains an inquisitorial burden to examine the material rigorously. In exceptional cases fairness may require further information or a change of procedure, but the statutory power to request information or convert an appeal into a hearing does not ordinarily become a duty. An advertisement consent appeal remains a civil appeal despite criminal liability for displaying an advertisement without consent.

The claimant sought statutory review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 of the Secretary of State’s decision dismissing its appeal against refusal of advertisement consent.

The proposed consent concerned a temporary illuminated advertisement and shroud on a derelict former office building. The Inspector proceeded by written representations and dismissed the appeal, finding insufficient evidence that the site was being actively marketed or that redevelopment was imminent.

The claimant alleged procedural unfairness, breach of the Tameside duty to inform the decision-maker, and failure to address the relationship between Local Plan Policy CC5 and national planning guidance.

1. Grounds 1 and 2 dismissed. The general rule is that parties to a planning appeal must place before the Inspector the evidence and representations on which they rely. The Inspector is entitled to decide the appeal on the material submitted, subject to the overriding requirement of fairness and the inquisitorial obligation to examine that material rigorously: West v First Secretary of State [2005] EWHC 729 (Admin).
2. The same principle applies despite the later statutory regime under section 319A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and the Part 1 procedure under the Town and Country Planning (Appeals) (Written Representations Procedure) (England) Regulations 2009. The availability of a power to request further information under regulation 8 does not impose a duty to seek further evidence whenever an appellant has failed to establish its case.
3. Fairness is context-dependent. It may exceptionally require an Inspector to request information or consider changing a written procedure to an oral hearing. Here, the claimant knew that active marketing and progress towards redevelopment were disputed issues, addressed them in its appeal documents, and had every opportunity to provide supporting evidence. The Inspector was therefore entitled to assume that the written representations contained the evidence the claimant wished to submit.
4. The fact that displaying an advertisement without consent is a criminal offence did not impose a higher general inquisitorial duty. An advertisement consent appeal remained a civil appeal. The procedure was fair, and there was no duty to seek corroboration or change the procedure to a hearing.
5. The Tameside duty was not breached. The Inspector had sufficient information to determine the appeal, and it could not be said that no reasonable decision-maker would have been satisfied with the inquiries made.
6. Ground 3 dismissed. The decision letter, read fairly and as a whole, addressed both the Planning Practice Guidance and Local Plan Policy CC5. The Inspector considered the effect on the wider area, not merely the building, and reached a planning judgment that the advertisement had remained for longer than a temporary period and harmed local amenity.
7. All grounds were rejected. The claim was dismissed. It was unnecessary to consider section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981.

First-instance statutory review proceedings. Permission was initially refused by Lang J on 24 July 2024. On renewal, Sir Peter Lane granted permission on 28 November 2024 on grounds 1, 1(a) and 3. The High Court rejected all argued grounds and dismissed the claim.