Abdul Razzaq Yousufi v Raj Matharu

In a claim relying on deceit as the unlawful means in the tort of causing loss by unlawful means, the claimant need not plead the precise route by which an intended third-party representee received the false representation. The essential questions at the pleading stage are whether a false representation was made with the requisite intention and whether the intended representee acted upon it. The fact that an intermediary, including the police, may have transmitted the representation does not automatically defeat the claim. Questions about the actual route of communication, reliance, factual plausibility and causation are ordinarily matters for evidence. In an intentional tort requiring an intention to injure, the scope for novus actus interveniens is particularly limited. A potentially arguable claim should not be stifled by refusing an amendment where the opposing party shows no irremediable prejudice.

The appellant challenged a Deputy Master’s decision refusing permission to amend his Particulars of Claim and striking out claims for business losses, loss of a chance and lost profits. The proposed amendment abandoned malicious falsehood and relied on deceit as the unlawful means in a claim for causing loss by unlawful means.

The appellant alleged that the respondent knowingly made a false blackmail report to the police intending that it would reach prospective investors in a Pakistani cricket franchise, causing them to disengage from the appellant. The Deputy Master considered that the pleading failed to identify the means by which the allegation reached the investors, that causation was fatally flawed, and that any police disclosure would be a novus actus interveniens. The central issue was whether those matters justified refusing amendment and striking out the claim at the pleading stage.

1. Appeal allowed. The Deputy Master’s order striking out the relevant claim was set aside. Permission was granted to amend the Particulars of Claim.
2. The pleaded unlawful means was deceit practised on the investors, not on the police. Deceit is actionable by the third party, or would be actionable if that party had suffered loss. The tort can arise where a false representation is communicated indirectly, provided it is intended to reach the representee and is acted upon.
3. The precise mechanism by which the representation reached the investors was not an essential pleading requirement. The pleading alleged a false representation, the requisite intention, its intended communication to the investors, their awareness of it and resulting commercial disengagement. The route of transmission was principally a matter for evidence and might be relevant to reliance and factual plausibility.
4. The court rejected the narrow approach which treated the police as the relevant third party and required an intention that the police themselves should cause economic loss. The focus was whether the unlawful means interfered with the investors’ freedom to deal with the appellant and thereby caused him loss. This was consistent with the limitations identified in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21 and Secretary of State for Health and another v Servier Laboratories Ltd and others [2021] UKSC 24.
5. Whether an intervening act breaks the chain of causation is fact-sensitive and depends on all the circumstances, including foreseeability and deliberateness. In an intentional tort requiring an intention to injure, the scope for novus actus interveniens is extremely limited. The pleaded case did not require the respondent to be vicariously responsible for the police or any other intermediary.
6. Under the overriding objective, amendments should be permitted where necessary to determine the real issues justly and proportionately, unless they cause irremediable injustice. No such prejudice was demonstrated. The amended Particulars of Claim were to be filed and served within 14 days, with 28 days thereafter for any amended Defence. Costs were reserved for written submissions.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): Appeal from the Deputy Master’s decision of 20 October 2023 and order dated 8 November 2023. Appeal allowed; the striking-out order was set aside and permission to amend was granted.